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Friday, 3Inrcli 1, 1660. 
GEIEBAT, SII: FREDERICK C. A. STEPHENSON, G.C.D., Vicc- 
Prcsidciit, in tlic Chair. 
THE RELATIONS BETWEEN LOCAL FORTIFICATIOXS 
AXD A XOVIXG NAVY. 
By Rcnr-Admiral 1’. II. CoLom. 
IS R lccturc dclivcrd in this t1ic:itrc on tho 18th Jaiiuary Captain 
Stoiio of thc R o ~ d  Brtiilciy mndc sort of oxcuisus iuto tho domin  
of nnvnl nctioii aid policy, wlicii discussiiig thc cmploymcnt of ‘ l  Quick- 
firing Guns for Yortrcss Dcfcncc.”’ In Iayiiig down ccrtain proposi- 
tions with r c p r d  to tlic rcspcctirc functions of n moring Xary nnd 
fircd fortificntioiis, 2nd iii dcclnring hiusclf :L “1ookcr o n ”  at thc 
garno of n cornbiricd cffort, 01’ of :L rival cffort, bctwccn tlicsc two 
clcmcuts of dcfcncc, I thonglit C;iptniri Stoiio was doing good scrvico 
in  cliallcnging, ab initio, tliosc who supported or dcnicrl liis positions, 
t o  como out, : i id stntc tlicir casc. As 1 listcncd to’tlic lccturo and to 
tlic discussion, I cnmc to tho conclusion tlint probably ncithcr lccturcr 
nor nudicncc liad cscrtcd tlic critic11 fnciilty in su5cicnt strcngth to 
notice how far mi ncccptnnco of tho propositioiis put forward iniglit 
lcnd us if wc followcd tlicm up;  niid a t  thc samc tinic, I fcli t l in t  
under n pnpcr with n sccoiidnry titlc, it would hardly Lc convcnicrit 
to irisc n full dcLntc ou primary issucs. 
But thosc who listcncd with mc, must, I tliink, agrco that primary 
issucs of gimt moment wcrc miscd in tho paper, niid pioiiounccd 
upon with dccision in n wiy wliicli does not who113 nccord with somo 
pcisnniably carcful cxnminations that havo bccn rcccntly madc. 
Tlic paper on tho ‘ l N n ~ a l  Dcfcnccs of thc United Ringdoxn,”~ 
wliicli I liad tlic liononr to rcad licrc last ycnr, did undoubtcdly tend 
t o  rniso the -inluc of moving nnvnl dcfciicc d i d  to dcprcss that of 
locally fiscd dcfcncc. Cnptnin Stonc’s pnpcr, t o  which, so far, this is 
3 rcply, unqucstionnbly took the opposito vicwv, aiid pmtimlly 
claimed that ‘ l  Naval Uefcnco” wns n contradiction in terms; tho 
75Zc of tho Navy not bcing defcnco a t  all, but attack. Ucrc, ns thc’ 
Ltwycrs say, l1 issuc is joincd” and most convcnicntlj- so for discus- 
sion. It is sccn that D vcry widc dirergcnco of opinion is not only 
possible, but is in flourisliing cxisfcncc, on thc subject of tlic re1 n t’ ions 
bctwccn k c d  fortifications and a moving Navy, and I liardly 
Scc anfe, p. 1. 





























160 TIIE RELATIOSS DET\YEES LOCAL FORTIFIGATIOSS 
think vio cnn bcttcr cmploy couple of hours tlinu by cndcavoui*ing 
to thnsli out somc of thc truth as to thcsc relations. 
I n  tlio Navy I vcnturo to think that w c  ought to bc n grcat deal 
more critical and observant than wo aro ou tho subject of our find, 
or lomlizcd, defcnccs against naval attack. And though I ndvcrt to 
tho matter with tlic grcntcst possiblo difidcnco and dcfcrCxicc, I 
somctimcs fcnr that thc Armj  is hurting its eniciency by pressing 
forwnrd tlic idcn of strong const works nt home nnci nbroad. I sit nt 
tbo fcct of Coloncl31aurico so far ns I form auy notions of militarr 
policr, nnd I €ail to sec lion- such vicirs as ho csprcsscs stand nriy 
chanco of being cnrricd out, if \vo arc to greatly shut up tho military 
forces of this countv in dctachcd garrisons 811 ovcr tlic world. 
IVitk still greatcr dcfcrcncc, and Tery humbly iridccd, I vcnturc to 
say that i n  our military policr, I sccm to dctcct tlirco incornpatiblo 
lincs bcing pursued. Them is tho liuc which steadily rcpids thc 
inrnsion of tlicsc islands, not as a I’ossiblo conclusion to n series of 
disnsteis such ns history funiishcs us with no csninplcs of, but ns nit 
incidcnt of w i r  nt lcnst as promincntlj near us as n grcnt scn-figlit. 
This linc, whcn pursued, dcunnds tlic raising, maintainiiig, and tmin- 
ing of R rnst  body of t roop on principles such ns WC find hi conti- 
ncntal couxitrics, nnd it will :isk for tho fortification of London, a t  
Icast, if not for courcrting clcfcnsiblc points surrounding London 
into a scrics of first class fortresses. I t  was this policy that dictntcd 
tLc p c a t  land-sidc morks which profess to dcfcud tho Arsenals of 
Portsmouth mid Plymouth. 
Tho sccond linc of policy is d i n t  I undcrstnnd to bc that of Colonel 
Xanricc, whcrc tlio i l r m j  is to bu prc~inrcd for cmbnrkntiou under 
thc con\-oy of, and disembarkation nndcr cowx of, tlic Flcct, for tlioso 
snddcn military attacks a t  unImqni.cd points of tLo encmj’s shores, 
mliich thc rapidity nud ccrtaintj of tmusport over n commnndcd sen, 
mnkcs casy for this nation. 
Thc third linc of policy is that slictclicd by Cnptniu Stonc, if I 
rightly npprchcnd hiw, namely, tho dispcisnl of tho Arniy all owr thc 
world in  detnchcd garrisons. 
Tho tlirec lincs of policy would sccm to mo to require tlircc scpniztc 
armies to C ~ I T ~  out in their cntircty ; nnd if I endcavour in this p p c r  
to diow C ~ I I S C  ngaiiist thc last of tlicui, \rhcrc m y  naval knowlcdgc, 
and somc study of tho qucstion may justify mc in Lolding nu opinion, 
I trust I slinll not linvc iritrudcd too far on military ground in 
mentioning tlic first nnd second. 
Nothing conld bc more siitisfiictorily clcnr than Cn h i n  Stono’s 
espression of vicw : nxid it is a l ~ n y s  mi advnntngo to t t u solution of 
n controvcrtcd question to start with a clc:ir cnuncintion. 
“J ly  prcrniss is,” snjs Cnptnin Stonc, “tlint tlic posscssion of 
n a r d  aiscnals, dockyards, and conliug stations must pi-nctically dccidcr 
thc question of naval supremacy ; tlint such suprcmncy is :ibsolutcly 
esscutinl to our cristcncu as o uatiori; and tlint the way to sccurc i t  
is to fortify axid arm our 01vn niscunls, dockjards, and coaling stations 
in  such a fnsliiou as to cnnblc tlicm to resist an cIicmy’s nttacks, and 





























.\SD X JIOYISG X.L\’Y. 151 
tho cncmy with such forco BS may bo arailablo, aftcr providing for 
tho patrolling of our principal tradc routcs, and tlio forinntior1 of 
such flccts RS m a r  bc considcrcd mccssary to cnnblc 11s to forco on a 
iinrnl ciigqcmcnt wlicn opportunity offcrs, with forccs ndcquntc to 
inflict n crushing nnd dccisivc blow on tlic cucmy.” 
Tlic main vicw hcrc is that thc fortification of posts dcscribcd will 
cnable n gircn nnvnl forcc to do things wliicli i t  could not do wcrc 
thc posts lcft locally undcfcnded; and a principlc iiridcrlics it, dcciar- 
i ng  that n:wal forcc is not properly a dcfcnsivc, but :in offcnsivc forcc; 
whilc military forcc, conccntr:hxl i n  locditics, is truly tlic dcfcncc of R 
mnrititnc cmpirc. 
Sir Jolin Adyc, in n Icttcr to tlio “ Times” last ycnr, 011 ~ l i i c l i  
I had tlic temcrity to offcr soinc criticism, did not quite taku up tliu 
general rclntions bctwccn fortilicd linrbonis nnd movinn flccts, but 
113 spoke of “:tdcquntc ~ a n c ~  (Icfcxiccs of our linrbours’ being tho 
I‘ complcmcnt ” of thcir naval dcfciiccs. Ho ~ircs~ipposcd, ~ O ~ V C F C P ,  
a t  lcnst so fa r  ns our hoinc ports RI’O conccrnctl, 3 loss of tho 
commnnd of tlic scn, and an ciicmy frcc to ntlnck witlicut fcnr of 
interruption from tho sen. 1x0 said : ‘‘ A s  regards land dcfences, 
I would p i n t  out, in tlic first plnco, that should this country bo 
thiratcncd with attack by nil czpcditicn across tho scd, i t  is \-cry im. 
portnnt tlint our cncmics should bc dcnicd ncccss to o u r  Iinrbours, 
:rnd should Lo compcllcd, n t  nll cvcnts, to make tlicir nttciiipt on tho 
opcn coast. Thcir clianccs of SUCCCSS will bc much iniiiimized if tlicy 
harc no sccurc basc of opcmtions.” (Sir Edwnrd Iiamlcy nscd, 
I think, tho sninc nrgument in tlic snmc way.) 
“Tlint is onc point, but tlicrc ni’o othcrs. Whcn Iiostilitics nrisc, 
our vsscls, \vhctlicr of wnr or of coinmcrcc, will oftcn rcqniru to 
rcturn to port to dischnrgc thcir cargoes, or to olitaiii supplies of 
coals, munitions, nnd food, Jcu. Thcy mny also l n r c  to  tnkc rcfugo 
in coiiscqncncc of dnmagcs in  action, or by strcss of wcatlicr; arid 
when ncccssity thus conipcls thcm to scck n harbour of rcfrc:it, it is 
csscntinl that thcy should bo nblc to rcfit in sccnritj-, nnd bc frco 
from molcstntion.” 
TVo can sce tlint tho 
sanic vicm prcciscly docs xiot nuimnto tho  minds of two milit:iry mcn, 
onc of whom brings to it tho wciglit of espcricncc in n long and w r y  
distiuguishcd cnrccr; whilc tho 0 t h  must t rc i t  it bj- tlic light of R 
Icss cslicriciiccd iutelligcncc, whicli cvcn n short mrccr has s l i~wn to 
bc of a high clans. 
Pirscut to Sir  Johu Adyc’s mind is 3 pictnrc of xnorc or lcss 
failuro of our  naval forccs, more or Icss incapacity to protcct tcrritorp 
by pumly naval means, or morc or less defeat at scn. If fortifications 
arc ncccssary to “ dcny tho  cncmy ncccss to our Iiarbours,” if tllor 
aro rcqnired to  cnnblc “ wsscls wlicthcr of war or of commcrcc, . . . 
to return to port to dischnrgc their cqrgocs or to obtain supplics of 
coals, munitions, and food, kc.,” this  must citlicr bc bccauso of the 
inability of R moving Navy to do it ; or k c a u s c  tho militnrj- defcnco 
by fortificntions can do it cqnnlly wcll a t  R much morc cconcmical 
mtc. If fortifications nrc ncccssarr to cnnblt; ships to take rcfngo 





























152 THE RELATIOSS I3ETKEE.V LOCLIL FORTlJ3CATIOSS 
under nftcr dnm:igcs in nctiou, or by stress of wcathcr, thc conccptioii 
lliust be that thc cnciny lias bcatcu tlicm so ~nuch  n s  to bc nblo to 
folloiv thciii up, and to bo only prcvciitcd from aiiniliiliitiiig them, or 
Lindcring tlic imtorntion of their cflicicncy, b~ tho fortifications 
\Tithin whicli'tlicy 1 1 3 ~ ~  sccurcd thcmsclvcs. 
T~ICSO scvcid conditions do not nppcar to be at first prcsciit to 
Captaiii Stone's miiid. In liis vicw tho Navy is in full coiiipetcncc 
arid ctliciciicy. But 
fortified arscuals and ports of supply nrc a coi iwtr in~t  ?~reflrod of re- 
leusirig ancal force lcliiclr fiittst ofhemiss. be Jefatied locally for tltc 
(ZP~CJICC of thc ports. It is, in Captain Stone's conccption, n funda. 
nlclitnl postulate of nn-inl warf:irc, that when on Admiral lcarcs thc 
nrsciial fi-oni which liis flcct cmcrgcs complctc, for tlic purposo of 
nu attack on otic of tliosc of tlic CIICIUJ-, hc must bc assured that liis 
own port is thoroughly \re11 locally dcfciidcd. Arid tlic iiiferciice is 
that if it is not thoroughly well locally dcfcndcd, 110 conuot attack, 
for Iio must rcmaiii thcrc to dcfcnd it himsclf. 
Undoubtcdly both scts of opiiiioiis ns to thc relations bctmccii 
fortificd ports and n mo\-iiw XLVJ IWO largely hcld; niid tlio holding 
of tlicm is not confincd to tyic militayy scrvicc. Uciug largcly hcld, 
it almost incvitably follows thnt thc1.c must bc, somcwlicrc, n ccrtniii 
amount of triitli about tlicni. But, 011 thc othcr liniid, I tliiiik i t  miy 
be aafcly said that nonv of thciri woiild :irisc riaturally out of tliu 
htudy of iiaval history. Jlorc than that, I tliiiik tlicy do iiot nrisc 
directly frorii tho rcasoii of thc thing, whcn IVC come to fncc it. 
I rntlicr tliink sucli thoughts nro not tho causc, but tlic cflcct, 
of fortilicd ports. Haying olscrwd fortified ports all over tlic ivorlcl, 
11 o 11;ivo imitatcd, without much closc cxnminntion, that which wc 
havv SCCII, :id npplicd i t  to our own ports ; hming donc so, \vc scarcli 
for  nud produce sucli misons d'drc ns ITO nrc able, to nccouiit for tlicir 
pcsciicc, nud tlicn IVC call in tliosc misoils d't3rc a s  :in arguruciit for 
tlic cstcnsion of thc systcni. 
Thc importaricc of tliu qucstion I misc, aud tLc di5cultr in dcaling 
with it, spring from tho fact that, pritiicijacie, no onc dcnics tho vnlnc, 
if not thc ncccssitJ-, of :L ccrtain :imouiit of local dcfencu for thc ports 
of :I inaritimo cmpirc. I cau 
nwer  forget that wliilc ninny Inilitnrj- nud pcrhnps Iiiorc ~invnl mcii 
think that tlic gigaiitic dcfcnsivc works of Portsmouth and l'lyinouth 
Invc bccn orcr-donc, Coloncl Schnw dcmnndcd, iii this thcntrc, in 
Dcccmlwr, IESG, that 633,0002. morc slioiild bc spent upon tliosc nt 
Pljmoutli bctow thcy could bc in nn \my considcrcd compleic. I 
jcar. It will bc fresh in nll our  minds tlinL tho dcmancl for local 
works, both ucw nud ndditionnl to old oncs, was rcry lnrgc iiidccd, 
and tlint tlic actual inillions tnkcii up by lonu for this scrvicc did b u t  
partly rcprcscnt tlic view wliicli was put f o r n n d  :s to tlic iicccnsitics 
of tlic cnsc. 
Wio is to fix thc dcgrcc of fortification nt which thc local dcfciico 
of a port should stop T If an nuthorilj dcclnrcs tlic fortification of 
a q -  port is insufficient, what orguuicxits can wc use to prow that it is 
'fhere is no question of its failuro in niij way. 
Unt thcn no onc know, ivlicrc to stop. 
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siifiicicnt ? As n ncvnl fricnd of minc, for wliosc opiiiioii I rcnson- 
ably liavc n high rcspcct, lias said : “ Thcrc is nothing bctivccn n liglit 
battcry nnd n first clnss fortress.” I, iiiysclf, linvc gcncidly fclt that  
thc nrguincuts wliich will call for niiy fortification of :i port agaiiist 
xittacli from tlic sen will cqunllj apply to :isk for its dcfcncc ngninst all 
tho iinvics of tlic world. I cannot tcll, nip l f ,  d i n t  tlic nicnsurc of 
the dcfcncc oiight to bc; nud tliu only ccrtniii clicck I knot*:, upon 
cspcnditurc 011 local dcfcuccs when oncc wc Lcgiii, is our gcncral way 
of looking a t  it. 
It docs not n p p c : ~  to NO to Lo of any iiso snyinct that clcfciicc by 
the fortiticidion of ports and tlcfcncc by rr. moriiig h r r v j  must go linntl 
i n  linud. Wcrc thcy both undcr thc  same ndministixtivc control- 
wliicli could only Lo 11:ivnl coiitrol, with any reason-thcy iiiiglit Lo 
dealt with sido by sidc, tliougli I do not fliiiili tllnt cvcii tlicn tlicy 
could Lo said to go ‘I linnd in hand,” but  ns wc stnnd they nrc rivals 
for the opcn palm of tlic Chnnccllor of tlio Esclicqucr, aud nothing is 
to bc p i i i cd  from not rccnlliiig tlic fact aiid stntiiig i t  plniiily; Tho 
~ C : I S O I I  of tlic tliiiig, arid tlio l i istoq of thc tliiiig, conic t o  iny miud 
with rr. plain conviction that fortification of pork is but nu iiicflicicnt 
substitute for tlicir unral dcfciiec, aud t l int  ns 1c.c propose a naval 
i1icrc:isc wc sliould logically proposc n fortification dccrcnsc. 
J h t  tlic rcvcrsc is onr  policy, a i d  thc moment tlic uavnl cspcrts 
urgc n n:ird incrcnsc, tlio military cspcrts, and somctirncs tho naval 
OIICS too, nrc cqudly, if not morc urgelit for local port clcfcnccs. 
I sliould likc to say Iicrc, tliat for tlio purposes of m y  argunieiit, arid 
to Lccp it clcar of sido issues, I wish to roll tlic fortificatioii wliicli is 
got out of laud battcrics, coast defcncc vcsscIs, nnd stibrnnrinc mincs, 
all into one. l\‘hcn I spcak of fortified ports, I mcan ports that arc 
locally rotcctcd ngniiist attack, wlintcvcr tlic means nscd lriay bc. 
But 1 s o not iiiciudo such local :uid ~riornllc dcfcnccs-such light 
vcsscls--as niny bc prcpnrcd not to dcfcnd tlic port itself froin attack, 
but to wnrii off thc roving cruizcr which might seek citlicr to klockndc 
tlic plncc, or to cnpturc or dcstroy tho unnrnied ships frcqucntilig it. 
I climr n distinctiou, in fact, bctwccn the dcfcnce of tlic port ngnirist 
attack, nnd thc dcfencc of thc communications of tlic port. 
As I have wid nborc, 1 tliiuk thc bcst standard w o  can at prcscut 
crcct ns to tho shnrc wliicli fortifications slionld carry away froin tlic 
till of tho Cliniiccllor of the Exclicqncr, is ono dcpcndcut 011 our  
gcncial w ~ y  of looking n t  thc wholc qucstiou ; and I do riot know 
that tbcrc am any pimpcr spctaclcs through wliicli wc can SCC, csccpt 
tlio liistoricnl spcctaclcs. 
n u t  Ict mo Gist follow up t l c  thoughts that  harcfornicd tlicinsclvcs 
in Captain Stone’s mind as conscqucnccs of tho thesis uscd as o stnrt- 
ing point. 
Looking n t  tlic functions of tlio K:ivy hc tclls us that, “ upon thc 
decl:iration of \c.ar one of tlic first dutics of our  Nnvy will Lc to attack 
tlic encmj’s militciry ports, dockynids, aiid coaling 6tatiOUS, and thus 
sccurc hcavy odds in our firvour from tho ootsct. In ordcr to sccnrc 
tlic grcntcst results, tlic d e  of our Navy nrrtst be cssoifiaUy offeilsivr, 






























134 T I E  RELATIOSS IJET\YEES LOCAL FORTIFICITIOSS 
merit should haro h c u  nrouscd recently b r  tho naval rnniicouvi*cs, 
tending to form an i11icduciitcd public opinion in  favour of kccping 
our flccts in homo watcrs i n  any riationnl cmcrgcncy. Uombnrdmeiit 
is a n  opcrntioii which rcquii-cs :L \-a& cxpcndituro of ammunition nnd 
n considcrablo timc to bc cffcctirc, anti tlic nintcrial dnmngc inflicted 
is I,y IIO means proportionate to thc cost of tlic undertaking, or to t h c  
risk inciirrcd in c:irrjing it out.” 
Our flccts arc 
abscut mnking attacks on tlic cncmfs ports, which must be, by the 
hypothesis of possiblc attacks bchind thc Qccts, wcll known to Lc 
cuipty of thc  cnemg’s warships; tlicsc latter bciog, as IL conscqncncc, 
frcc to  do  what sccms good to tlicm. But t h y  nro witlllicld froni 
attacking our arscnals Lccausc of the strcngtli of tlicir fortifications. 
aiid from bombarding wlicrc thcrc arc nonc, bccausc of tlic cost and 
tedium of thc opcriation. 
“I will vcntui-c,” continues tho lecturer, ‘ L  to toiicli upon onc moro 
1iwa1 question, aud thnt is thc question of blockade. It lins lccii 
stated thnt to spend moncj- 011 lnud dcfciiccs, wliilc ou r  Kaq- is 
admittcdly insnfticicnt in . IiiiItiLcrs, strcngtli, and speed for  tlic 
duties it will linvo to pcrforni, is nn nltogcther rriistnlicn policy; 
:lid further, that  if oiir uarnl strength wcrc increased as it ought to 
bc, tlicrc would bo littlo or no iicccssitly for any lnnd dcffnccs n t  all, 
inasmucli as tlic enemy’s ports could Lo so cfficicntly blockadcd thnt 
our shores, o u r  coumcrcc, our Colonies, and oiir coding stntioiis would 
bo as frcc from Iiostilc cntcrpriscs as tLcy nrc in pcacc-timc. Our 
recent crpcricnccs of xiam1 block:idc, wlicn tlic I ‘  Ji‘nrspitc,” ‘I scrcrn1)‘ 
and “ 11;s ” cscapcd from Bcrcllavcn, nnd united nt n rcudcxrons otf 
thc Ucbriclcs with tho “ Rodncj-” from Lough Swillr, \vould sccm t o  
indimtc that tlic ganic of naval blockndc is likely to  bc a dnngcious 
and unprofitable ono for tho blockadcr, and thnt thc blockading 
squadron might employ its snpcrior strcngtli to Letter purpose, nnd 
murc i n  c o ~ ~ s o n ~ u c c  with thc figliting traditions of tho W t i s h  Envy, 
by attacking and scizing thc cncmy’s ports nnd coaling stations, mid 
thus foming on :L dccisivc naval engagement.” 
“Ito will, I trust, bc giantcd that thc Navy l ins its own splicrc of 
action quit0 npart from tlic cZe~c~~cc of ports and coding btations, nnd 
that  this duty must rcst principally with t l c  land forces.” 
Tlic “Tinics” lately rcniarked that a good dcnl of thc npparcnt 
cliffcrcnccs on dcfcncc qucstions procccded from want of clear dcfini- 
tions. 111 tlicsc pasagcs thcrc aro two wods, L‘offc~isivo’’ uud 
“ blockadc,” which aro nnibiguous, nnd nrc diffcrcntly undcistood. 
It has comc about that a naval meaning has cnvcloped tho ~ v o d  
“~ffcnsivc.” It is now common to hcar nav:il Officcrs spcak of 
“ offensivo dcfcncc,” but tlicy do not tlicrcby mcaii “ :ittack.” 
Thcy mean advanced dcfcncc, and I noticc tlic word applied Lot11 to 
tlic functions of a squadron watching an eucuij- i n  his own port, and 
!‘ dcfcuding ” thc sca bchind it, br making SUM that  if lic comes out. 
he will bc followcd R U ~  fought; nnd to tlic fiinctions of local dcfcnce 
YCSBCIS, wliicli opcrato in waters: adjaccnt t o  a port and arc ready to 
attack an cnemy Lcgond tho rcacli of thc httcrics.  
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TIic word “blockndc ” I cndcaronrcd to show in my pqw 011 tllc 
subject, covcrcd thrcc distinct mcafiings, namely, “scaliiig up,” ‘‘mask- 
ing,” and ’* obscrving,” and possiblj, if Captain Stoiic lias foudec\ 
his o inions ns to thc result of tlic experiments of I:ist year, on \d in t  
npprchcnd tlicir meaning ou Rcconnt of thc rarying raluc of tho term 
‘’ blockadc.” It is well known that h’clson rcpudintcd tho tcrni 
“ blockndc” when npplied to his long ~ a f ~ l i  of Pillcneuvc in Tonlon, 
nnd, whatcvcr diffcrciiccs thcrc may bc amongst naval ORicers ns to 
tliu capacity of n blocknding squadron to seal nnothcr up in its port, 
tlicrc is DO rift in tho gciicrnl .conviction that tlic ciiciny inust bc 
wntclicd whcrcvcr Iic is, iiiid followcd up, for t l i i t  tlic disrnption of 
tlic Rmpirc is ccrtniu if forco cnongli, and of tlio riglit kind, bc not 
provided for this purposc. 
ProIablyall that navnl Officcrs arc ccrtnin nbout with rcgnrd to tlic 
cscnpc of tho ships nnmcd from Rantry arid Lougli Swilly is,’tliat thc 
blockndcrs lind ncithcr force cnougli nor of tlic riglit kind for thc work 
tlicy lind in hand. Judgmcnt is pcrliaps suspcndcd on tlic point 
mlictlicr nny forco would bc coiripctcnt to s c d  up n dctcrmincd and 
cntcrprisiug cneniy. 
Captniu Stono haring, ns w e  scc, laid claim thc functions of fortifi- 
cations as freeing Ihc AT[tcy, incidcntnlly takes up Sir John ddyc’s 
position, and imagines 0110 of our flccts Icing driven into t h b  s1icltc.r 
of n fortificd Plymouth by a superior force of tho ciicniy, I‘ tLcrc to 
rcfit, co:iI; nnd awnit rcinforccmcnts.” That incans, of conrsc, thc 
loss of tho command of tho Chnnncl; and thus having gradually ntl- 
~ancccl on the origitial tlioiiglit of a S C ~  lcft opcri to tlio enemy, wliilc 
our Navy makcs on nttack 011 his land, ho passcs impcrccptibly to tlic 
contcrnplation of our absoluto loss of conimnnd nt sen as something to 
h looked for in ordinary course, nud ns something prcsuniablj rc- 
covcrnblo by military mcaris. 
“Tliu c u c  of Scbastopol,” hc says, “is c n n  moir: instructirc, 
affording ns . i t  docs nu actual pamllcl to cases with which wc nioy 
oursclrcs havo to deal ill tho cvciit of au iiivnsion of our’tcrritory.” 
Uci‘c, wc must obser\-c,,tliat never in any war wliicli might hayo 
pnrtakcn of thc n a d  character was t tcrc  such R collapsc ns the nav:il 
forcu of Russia cshibitcd. : Ncrcr in any naval war was tlicrc such 
coniplcta nnd nbsolnto commnnd of tlic sea ns England tlicn crijoycd. 
Wc SCC. thcn, how impcircptibly by laying dowii R ccrtaiii.foundatioi1 
and building on it, wc. comc to tlic calm prepnixtion for n state of 
things impossiblo bcforc thc entiir! dcstructiou and conqucst of what 
wc call tho British Empire. Yct I admit that Captain Stonc is con- 
scquciit in his illnstixtions. It 110s long sccmcd to tnc that if wc start 
with supposing, to lzsc Sir. John Adyo’s forcible and clifl‘crcntiatiiig 
words, t l int  fixcd fortifications nrc a ncccssarj “ coinplcmcnt ” of nam! 
foirc, wc must bo prcpnrcd to admit that total loss of command of thc 
sca is to I c  rcgnrdcd as bnt nn iiicidciit of i i a d  war. 
. Tlic conccptioii which Captain Stono lias of tho X a ~ y  carrjing tho 
WRY to tho cnwny’s coast, whilc Icai-jng nn nppnrcntly open sca bcliincl. 
it, lins so mncli truth in it thpt it rnnj  I c  said to bc 3s old ns n n d  






























war itself. But trio coiwctions nppcnr to bc ncccssnry hforc wc MIL 
say tlint it is wholly truc. I cn~i~iot s op to give instances, but tho 
riilo certainly is that a X ~ T Y  cannot nlono innkc attacks on tho ciicmy’s 
strongholds. Pcrhnps, if  wc tnkc out of the !ist of :ittacks tho 
bmbnrdmcnts of Algicrs, Acrc, nnd Swcaborg, wc shnll 1e:n-c notliing 
bcliiiid but sncli attacks as havc bccn ~iindc by tlic Aruiy under covci* 
of tlic Envy. I am surc, wlicn I iiicntioii it, t1i:it tlic fact will start 
up in cvcry mind as IL familiar onc, bnt I ouglit not to 1c:rvc it without 
rcniiriding you that tho wnut of troops w a s  tlic chicf tliing that para- 
lyzcd tliu Yrciicli X:ivy as nu nttncking forcc in tlic Fmnco-Gcrm:iii 
\Pal*. 
Tlm othcr corrcction is that the Atliriirals who 300 ycurs ngo rccoin- 
I I I C I I ~ C ~  thc policr of attack, ~icvcr imagined i t  rcquirctl’fortificcl bascs 
bcliind tlicm. Tlicir vicw was thc opposite. Sir Willinni ~ I O I I S O I ~ ,  
Elizabctli’s youngstcr nnd Jnnics 1’s Admiml, iii :idvocating 
that policy, wrote, “ that whilst tho Spniiiarcls wcrc cmplogcd at 
Lome bj- our yc:irlr Flccts, tlicy nc\-cr liad an opportunity nor lcisure 
citlicr to mokc an attcnipt on us or to divcrt tlic wars froin tlicmsclrcs; 
by which mcnns w e  \vcr’u sccurctl from any nttcmpt of tlicirs.” 
Tlic liistoricnl cnsc of this nctivc riaml policy stands this: It 
cannot bo uriclcrtnkcn nt nll until tlic cornmnutl of tlic sca is sccurcd- 
that is, until i t  is ccrtnin flint ncitlicr tlic bnsc nor thc coiiiniuiiicntious 
witli tlic bnsc can bc tlircatcncd, and tlint the operations ‘cnnriot be 
iritcrfcrcd with from thc sca. It must nlrrn~-s bc nbandoncd if tlicro 
is tlic lcast clinrico of tlic loss of this conimnud of tlic SCL 
Lct nic just rccall tlint so wcll lias tliis nlwnys becn uudcrstood t l int  
tlic csmmnnd of thc Uritish seas was tlio mainspring of :ill oni-naval 
wars, until R tiiiic cmuc whcn it u-as ivcognizcd tl int  wc opcncd tlic 
war on the bnsis tlint lvc held thc seas. Tlicrc is positivcly 110 cs- 
planation of rrhnt n-ns doric a t  sca in tlro Dutch \vais but this. It is 
incomprcliciisiblc that the wholo naval forcc of cnch sidc sliould haw 
c atlicrcd ng:iinst tho othcr ngain nncl ngaiii, and simply fought for tho 
mastcrj-, unless sonictliiug was to follow it whcu gaiucd. Aud what 
could follow i t  but tlic powcr of nttack on tcrritoiy as wcll as t l iu  con- 
trol of tlic ivntcr? Kcithcr tlic Dutch nor oursclvcs cvcr got so far in 
iiiastery at sc- ns to contcmplntc nttacks on territory, for wc cannot 
look a t  Do Ituj-tcr’s raid of lGG7, which could not bc put, in forcc 
until \vc h:id clisbandcd oiir Xavy, 11s nu rdtnck. It was an insult, 
undcr covcr of a not  cry crcdit:ible quibble. Fortificatioii could 110: 
l o  said to liavc comc iuto niiy rclntions with ihc inoring nnvics in tlic 
Dutch wars. Xcitlicr sidc could attack thcm for fcar of iutcrruptiou 
by thc othcr. 
Wlicu, Iatcr, \vc fcll into war with Fmiicc, tlicro was a t  first tlic 
smic tliing orcr ngniii. In 1G90 Lord Torrington had n divided forcc, 
and found IiirnscIf off tlic Isle of Wight in grcatly infcrior sticngth to 
thc French. Uut ho pcrfcctly understood tlic situation. Tho mcrc 
ucighbourhood of nn infcrior iinval forcc wliicli was frcd to attack 
was 3u nbsolutc bar to any opemtions of tlic ciicrnj- against our shores. 
“ A  strcngtli,” lic woto  to thc Council, “that puts me bcsidc tlichopcs 
of success if \\-c should figlit, qnd rcnlly may not ouly cndangcr tho 
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losing of tho Flcct bat nt Icnst tlic qnict of onr countrj-, too; for i f  wc 
: i i ~  Lcntcn, they bcing rnnstcrs of tho SCR will bc a t  great libcrtj of 
doing many things they darc not nttcmpt nliilst wc obscrvc tlicm, and 
nrc in n possibilitx of joining Vicc-Adtiiirnl Killigrcw and our sliips 
to tho wcstwnrd.”’ 
Xo conccivnblc 
nrrnngcmcnt of fortifications conlcl linrc strcngtlioncd Torrington’s 
Iinuds ; tlicrc wns no qucstion of fortiGcntions rc?icciiig his ~iarnl forcc. 
Tlic Frcncli Flcct was tlicrc cndcnvouring to figlit tlic English for tlio 
cornninnd of tlioso wntcrs, in ordcr snLscqncntl1 to innkc territorial 
attacks; Torrington could not ncccpt bnttlc bccmsc, if hc vicrc badly 
bcntcn, lic would ccnsc to opciato ns tho dcfcrisirc forcc that hn wns. 
Tlic \-cry objcct tho Frcnch had in vicm was to clrire hiin off tlic sca 
uridci. tcrritorid slicltcr, arid tlicrcforc tlic prorision of such slicltcr 
was not n tliiiq to Lo contcmplntcd by tlic Admiral. Tho on0 grcnt 
fear, both in tlic mind of thc Admiral niid of tho Conncil, was tlint hc 
iiiiglit linvo to rctiro riortli to thc Gun-flcct, wlicrc his obserrntion 
would Lo wcnkoncd ; and tho Council forccd on thc bnttlo of Ucncliy 
IIcncl to :troid it.’ Torrington, howovcr, saw moly? clcnrlr, and Iicwoulrl 
not nllon. tho h t t l c  to procccd SO fnr ns to Icavo liim rcnlly bcatcn. 
l3y this nctioxi lic won tho campnigu, nrid tlic Frcncli, failing to gct 
tliu coinninnd of tlic scn, wcrc obligccl to 3bnndon thcir dcsigns. 
Thc narrow straits in which ivc fonnd oursclrcs, had, I?y.tlio next 
p i ;  givcn wisdom to thc Council, niid Russcll, with n large conccu- 
tr:itcd forcc, fought tho conccntrntcd Xnvy of Frnncc nt La Hoguc 
cxictly on tlic pririciplcs, nnd with tlic objccts, of our  fights with tliu 
Dutch. Tlm E’rcnch wcrc thoroughly bcntcn, nnd cYer sinco h a m  
commcnccd \mrivith us 011 tlic nndcrstnnding tlint thcy vcrc to spcnd 
most of tlicir timc undcr tho slicltci. of tlicir fortifications, lcnving tlic 
.intci* tcrritory to us. 
Four tinics sincc then has Fmncc madc prcpnmtions for nn nttcmpt 
to wrcst this command of the sca from us, arid to fol101.r. it up by 
tcrritoi*inl attack. I n  1744, 1759, 1170, and lSO5, flccts wcro fitted 
out to disposscss onrs of thcir wntcr tcrritorr, and nrinics wcro hcld 
in rcndincss to invadc so soon ns thc Channel IVRS clcnr. In 174$ aud 
1779 tlic flccts shorcd in thc Chaniicl, but clnrcd not mnkc goocl thcir 
prctcnsions. In 1759 tho intcndctl Chnnncl commnndcrs \vci*o 
sninslicd up off their own coasts by Linwkc nnd Uoscnwcxi ; whilc in 
160s Trillciicuvc fnilcd of tlic ncmc which was rcquircd to facc thc 
criorrnous risk. 
tlicsc scrics of opcntions can wcbring oiir 
fortifications into rclntions with our flccts at nll in tlic homo wntcrs. 
On tlic otlicr Iinnd, thcrc wcrc always the closcst rclntions betwccn tlic 
.French flccts and the fortifications undcr which thcy shcltcrcd thcm- 
selves. Onr Admirals ncvcr thought about thcir bascs bciug fortificd, 
bcing fully pcrsundcd that thcr  wcrc thcmsclrcs thcir dcfcncc. And 
tho mcrc fnct that thc opcii anclioragcs of Caivsnnd Day, Torbay, 
Hcro wo linvc tho wholo nrgurncnb ‘ I  in little.” 
In no cnsc tliroug~i 
1 EutincL’s 
2 3Ir. Laughton tclls mc that tkij was ~ C C  t o  n clkcrc3itab:c intrigue of Rursdl’c.. 
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St. Hclcn’s, and tho Downs, were tlicir poirils d’oppi,  accounts for 
the abscrico of all cxprcssioris of doubt as to tlic support wliich ruiglit 
But I supposo tlic nnswcrmnybc tlint tlitse wcrc thednys of sailing 
ships, and that stcnni ]ins altcrcd nll tlic conditioris. It is riglit to 
ndvanco tlic nrgumciit, provided it bc followed iip, but not otlicrwisc. 
Espcrienco lins taught 11s ccrtain plnin principlcs of naval war, and 
.a  ncw fnctor has bccn introduccd. Wc canuot say tlint this ncw 
factor has voided oiir cxpcriciicc, though i t  is proper to say tlint it  
may liavc done so, and to czamino tlic possibility. 
Wliat is it thnt steam and clcctricity 1i:tvc donc for naval war?  
They hare cvcrywhcrc replaced uncertainty and chnncc, by ccrtninty : 
thcy Lave imnicuscly sliortcricd times, nnd distniiccs ns uicasurcd by 
times. 
If, in R gcncral way, thc bnlancc of power on a vatcr stage of war 
wns liablc in tlic days of sniliiig ships to tlistiirbnnccs through tho 
influcnco of tlic clinptcr of nccidcrits ; it. is f n r  less liable to such dis. 
4orbanccs siucc tho clays of stcarri. Tlicro Iins kcri  cspcricricc cnbugli 
to confirm tho dictum. l’crlinps thcro ncrcr was so smooth and mi- 
broken a naval campnign as ours np ins t  Russi:i. It was stcrrm alonc 
wliicli lirouglit it about. It is on clcarrccord that it was stcam alono 
wliicli enablcd tlic Ycdcnl States to adopt fl int  “ nnnconda”po1icy to 
wllicli thc Sontli ultimately succiimlcd. It could only bo tho conric- 
tion of thc usclcssncss of nll nttcmpts whicli cnused the Gcrmans to 
makc practically no divcraioris 1)y sen in thc Pmrico-Gcrmari Wnr. 
Certainly in  tlic Chilo-Pcruvian War tticro wcro CIOSS piirposes of 
the old sort until the “ LInnscar” was captured. Dut  a narnl war 
betwccn two ships on one side mid ono ship on tho othcr is linrdly of 
a clramctcr to gcncmlizc from. . . 
And so w c  liarc i t  that tho fcaturc of steam nand war is certainty. 
If i t  Ix! truc, ns uridonbtcdly it is, tliat combinations for attack can bo 
Inor0 suddcnly nnd with less n’nrning put into action; i t  is nlso .truc 
th:rt thc tirno which chn Lc allowcd for tho attack, before i t  is intcr- 
ruptcd, is wry  much limited, arid tho litnit is very much xnorc sliarply 
and ccrtzinlj-. drawn. . With re,nard to fortified plnccs exposed to 
.attack from thc sea, tlic gcncml c5cct of steam can only have.hcn 
.to add to tlicir strcngtli, not to demand its.incrtasc.. KO o m  has yet 
disconxxil or inrcntcd L fortified p6rt capable of maintaiitirig itself for 
all time ogninsta scaattnck.’ ’ Every siicli placc as yct 1i:isfallcn~hcn 
attacked from tlic seal nnlcss rclicrcd from tlic sca, proridcd the attack 
.has bccn’pcrscvcrcd in. And tlic 1 x h t  is that stcam has xuadc rclicf 
from the sea niorc ccrtnin nncl more spcdy tlian i t  used to be. Relief 
which was ncccssniy to prcsciro Gibraltar used to reach that foitrcss 
in II month a t  tho ckrlicst. It wou1d:now reach it in threc or four days. 
An cncniy; with thrcc’ wccks before him, miglit rcry well proceed to 
the attack of a plncc, vhich lie coulil.nqt dream of if Iic lind onlj- tlireo 
days h f o m  hiin. Suffrcin, whcn lic dared tlic attwk on Trincomalec, 
1 Attnckcci from tlic ma. tha t  is, n3 I linro said i n  t l ic eirlicr pnrt of r q -  papcr, 
by comlincd nard nnd military forcc, tlic only force crpable of mnking n d c t c r m i n d  
rttacli. 
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did so bccauso 110 thought Huglics \\.as a tortnigZlt distant at b l a d t ~ s .  
A modcrn Suffrcin could not iiow attack Triiicomalcc hnlcss a 
modcrri Huglics was no ncarcr than Sucz. 
But  Ict 11s construct and follow up such n caw, as is suggcstcd by 
Captain Stone’s postnlatcs of tho rclations bctwcen the fortificd basc 
and  tho squadron which is attacking tho cricmj-’s arsenals. ht us 
snpposc tlint an Admiral is bombarding nrcs t  with tcn battle-ships, 
and  that lie is cnnblcd to do it bccansc! his base, Plymouth, is sccurcly 
fortificd. I must nssumc that, in thc ricw put  foiw-nrd, tlicre is an  
unmnskcd forcc of tlic cncmy within striking distancc of P l p o n t l i ,  for 
i f  tlicrc bc not, tho fortifications can play no part. Thc condition of 
tlic Admiral off Drcst is tliat hc requires constant supplics of till kinds 
from his Lasc; tlicro will bc a constant going and corning of store- 
ships nud war-ships, and cvciy now and tlicli an  injurcd ship going 
homo for repair. Thc Admiral is distinctly told tliat lie has his “ow~i 
spliero of action quitc npart from tho dcfcticc” of Plj-mouth ns a port, 
but in tho middlc of liis bombardment hc rcccires intclligcncc that 
five of tho cncmy’s battlc-ships--a pnrt of his unmasked force-arc 
lj-ing a niilc or two off Penleo Point, just clcar of tliu P I p o n t l i  
battcrics. TI‘lrat is the Admiral going to  do ? Can Iio go on with his 
bombardmcnt, wliilc a11 liis supplics nro linblc to be cut off, a d  his 
ships, in going and coming, to Lo dcstroycd in dctnil? It may Lo 
pcrfcctlg true thnt tkcsc cnemics cannot long maintain thcmsclycs, 
tliougli why t h y  sliould not do just ns Iic kinisclf is doing, it is not so 
easy to see. But 1 do not  tliiiik tlicrc can bc any disagrccincnt 
nmongst us in  dcciding that our Admiid  Iias no courx o p n  to him 
bat to abandon his n thck  niid procccd full spccd aftcr tho Gro battlc- 
sliips that  liavo bccn t1:rcatcning his comtnunications. 
Yct, if this lm so, tlic diolc! thcorr of fortifications at tho Imsc 
‘‘ rclicring ” tho naval forcc fdls to the ground. Plj-rnouth, scpwatcd 
from him, is as bnd-to him-as Plj-mouth dcstroj-cd; and tlio 
tlircat of scpantion governs his conduct in prccisclj- the snmu waj- :is 
thc  t h a t  of destruction does, As far ns I cnii carry my rcnsoning 
powcis this hypotlicticnl case is coIiclusiyc, arid it govcrns tlic circom- 
stances of cvciy opcn port which is fortificd. ‘llicrc rcuiains no 
ground for sajing that tho fortiGcntion of n port wliich it is neccssarj- 
to kccp opcn will in tho slightest dcgwc rclicro tlic usvnl forcc. 
But -suppose Plymouth in this cxso to Iiarc no fortifimtions at 
all. What  tlicn? I imagine i t  will bc said that tho five battle-sliips 
would stcam up and dcstroy tlic dockynrd, mid so do a permanent 
injury instcad of a tcmporarj- onc. If so, thc Drcst flcct must still 
comc honic just as hforc,  nnd, thcrcfom, tlicrc is no cffcct on thc 
fnll.wj- that tkc fortilications of thc basc, or opcn port,,will rclicrc tlic 
naval forcc. But an iniicr qucstion nriscs as to whctkcr tho fii-u 
lattlc-ships rcoirhl Stcam up and dariiigc, CVCII if i t  wcrc cntircly nn- 
fortiGcd ? N ~ r a l  history, as far as it gocs, is coIiclusiw with o ncgatirc 
aiiswcr. It tclls us that tho nciglibourliood of a possibly intcrf’ering 
naral forcd is a cornplctc bar to any.att :di  011 tlic sliorc wlatcvcr. 
Thougb t-imc prcss-a. me, I cannot forlcar.to givc some illustrations. 






























1)yRusscll in 1G01. Tlio Frcncli flcot i n s  tlicn cnrrjing on opciations 
ng ins t  Barcclonn, biit tho arrival of our flcct a t  C:irtliagciin \\-as 
sumcicnt to C ~ U S O  tlicii. critirc abandomciit, and to forcc thc Frcncli to 
nttiro to Tonlon. 
Nes t  ycnrlhsscll,  bcing cngngcd in an  nttnckon Palmns, 150 miles 
from Toulon, nbandoncd it on nows rcnchiug him that thc Frcncli 
wcro in a condition to put to sca froiii that port. This iristaricc is 
tho more iiitcrcstiiig sincc, n t  tlio \-cry samo time, ivc, bcing uii. 
tlircatcncd by sca in tlic Channcl wcro at our lcisuro bombarding, niid 
i n  great part dostrojing, St. 31alo, Granville, Diirikirk, and Cnlnis. 
Thc attcnipts to rc-cnpturc Gibraltnr, mado by thc Pi*cncli in 
170l-5, wcrc nlwnys friistrntcd bj tlio appcnrancc of Sir Jolin Lc:ikc's 
squadron from Lisbon. Tkico \\-as tlic attack procccdcd with, arid 
tivico \\-as i t  :ibnndoiicd in fcar of Lc:ikc's ships. 
Thurot's clabomtcly prepared cttnck on thc  cast const of England 
in  1750 IYIIS prcwntcd by tlic prcscnco oE tlic squndrons of Corn- 
modorc Boys and Sir Picrcy Brctt. 
In  1782 Snffrciri was procccding to tlic attack on iSc,nnpatam with 
land forccs. Thc intclligcncc thnt S i r  E. Huglics \ m s  in thc vicinity 
cnuscd tho immcdintc discnilarkation of tlic troops, and nbaiidonniciit 
ot tho clcsign. 
IVhcncvcr it lins bccn dctcrmincd to procccd with a tcrritorial 
attack cnpnblo of intcrrnption fiam tlio sen, it lias bccu ncccssary, 
cithcr to mask tlic intcrrupting forcc, or to cmploy n tlcct of obscrvn- 
tion ns n p a r d  against intcrfcrcncc. 
Thus, Sir Gco~gc  Rooko could not harc nttackcd Gibraltar had hc 
not bccn nblc to do it with no morc than t\vcnty-two ships, d i i l c  
tliirtpscvcn fornicd D guard rcnilly to c n p g c  tlic Frcucli if they hod 
appcnrcd. 
\Vhcn Dc Grasso captuiwl thc islnnd of Tobago in 1761, nlniost 
under tho guns  of ltodncy n t  U~rbados, lic took cnro not orily to 
cmploF snrprisc in  the opcmtion, but  to linvc snch n covering flcct as 
madc it impossiblc f o r  Rodncg to think of nttnckiiig him. 
Wlicn Suffrciri cnptureil Tiincomnlcc in 178.2, 110 bclicvcd lic i n s  
taking pains to aLssiirc liimsclf that  S i r  Edwnrd Uuglics' flcct \\-as nt 
least IL fortnight distant; bu t  yet tlio thing was donc iindcr p a r d  of 
n flcct which was cnpnblo of fighting ;L drnan lntt lc with IInghcs on 
thc  tcntli dn~,  the placc hmiiig fallcn on tlic ninth. 
When i t  was determined to attack St. Jlalo and otlici. piaces on 
tlio Prcnch coast, i n  1745, nu csscntinl part of the plan was tlio mnsk- 
ing  of tlic Prcnch war-ships in nrcst  by Lord Anson. 
Iu  1 i G 1 ,  whcn Kcppcl att:ickcd nnd capturcd Bcllcislc, i t  was n 
ncccssary clement of succcss that  a strong squadron should mask thc  
ships iii Brcst. 
2\11 tlicsc lcssons nro found in  ful l  fwcc as lntc as tlic 1' ranco- 
German Wnr. Tlicn Bonct-J\'illanmez in command of a rastly supcrior 
flcct, yet would not risk thc simplc bombardment of an ill-dcfciidcd 
coast town, Kolbcrg, bccausc of possiblc intcrruption at tho hands of 
tlie inferior German sqiindron, wliicli was 700 miles distant. 
But to mnkc thc rrnsoning complctc, 7cc must not omit to notc that 
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two Cornmnndcrs, nnd I h l i c v c  t w o  only, h a r e  bccn found to defy 
t h c w  lcssons of cxpcricncc-thc Diiko of IIcdinn Sidonio, nnd 
Admiinl Pci-ano : tlic fornicr clcficd thc  tlirc,lt of tllc ~ iavnl  forcc o t  
Plymouth, tho lnt tcr  of tbnt  n t  Poln. Whctlicr n th i rd  Coniinnndcr 
will bo found to follow in tlicir footsteps is proI )~bIy  qiicstioitnblc. 
The fnct tlint h fortified h e s t  mid n fortificd '~oiiloii Ii:ts n l w n p  
prcscrrcd tho Frcncli flccts frlmi our nssndts  is, of co~irsc, conclusivc 
ns nil nrguinrnt  tlint'tlic iinvnl T'ocvcr wliicli l~ae  not tllc couini:ind of 
tlic! m i ,  may, 1 ) j  mrnns of fortificntioris, prcsciw n flcct for  n timc at  
niiy rate. It i s  n niattcr of fair rcnsoiiing to say tlint i f  j o u r  flcct is 
tIic most prccious th ing  yon Lnvc, c r c n  wlicii i t  rcitiairis in :I stiitc of 
forccd iri:iction, you can prcscrrc i t  iii yoiir Lnr1)oiirs LJ iiit'niis of 
local dcfcnccs of firicli streiigtli ns will seiitl thc  c n c m j  n n p - L c r c  nnd 
c r c r p h c r c  bcforc lie will bu drivcn t o  mnko his nttnck on tlic 
fortilicd ports. Uut irc cannot forgct, n t  tlic wino time, thnt n 1lOllSC- 
holder can mnkc tlic fiistciiiiigs of his hnll ~ C J W  LO st rong t1i:it t h c  
v c r ~  Inst thing tlic 1)iirgI:ir will tliiiik of will Lc tlic forcing of thcm. 
nut I conccivc wc l i n n  cstablislietl tlic fact t h a t  Lcforc n countr! can 
cruploy such fortificntions at nll, F I I C  niost have surroidcred tliu 
coiiimnnd of tho sen, nnd if such coiiiiiinnd lins been u c c c s s n r ~  to her 
em piiv, slio rnnst linrc nlnndoiied criipirc. 
Lc t  us for om iiiomeiit push this tliouglit home as in tlio npplietl 
case of onc of our flccts b c i q  bcntcn uiidcr tlic slicltcr of the  
Plymonth works. W k c n  wc tliink of such R thing, \vc 1nust, iii tho 
hicc of what  has bcen snid, siipposc t h t  we h:ivu iio rclicviric Ilect n t  
hand. Wcrc tlierc such n flcct, i t  is m:iiiifcst tlint tlic rictorious 
eiicmy ~rould court  dcstructioii i n  pursiiiug O U Y  bc:itcn flcct up  :In 
iritricntc! hnrbour, irlicro i t  wns IinLlc to bc cnuglit by tlic rclicviug 
fleet. IVc do not, i i i  fiact, i n  oiir tlioiiRlits iitliiiit t h c  osisteticc of 
n rclicving flcct. There coiild not bc such n tLiiig a t  Portsrnoutli, for 
iiistniicc. Yct tlic thcory must  be tlint iii S O I I ~ C  wriy this com~iiniitl of 
t h e  sen, whicli l ins  lircn lost, c:~ii IIC rcg:iiiiccl, nnd bc rcgniiictl out of 
P l j m o u t h  alone. JIow is tlic flect which h i s  been dcfaitccl into 
Plymouth to comc victorions out  of it ? And supposing such a thing 
possililc. how long will i t  bc bcforo this Lnpliciis, nud w h t  will tlio 
encrny bo doing mcniititnc ? 
It is a clcur historical fact  tlint. France never tiicd to  g c t  tho  
command of tlie Chnnncl nnless shc  liad :in nrmy rcndj to  mnkc usc 
of tiint commnnd. Will s h c  not  nlivnys follow tlint pln~i, my, is this 
no t  i v l i n ~ w o  am cliicflr told to  fcnr :i Woiild it., in :my of t h o x  cases 
1 have inentionccl, Iinvu mntteyccl tho lcnst to I ~ m n c c  whctlicr sho 
Iiad drivcn our flccts under fortifications, or only up tlic linibour ? 
Would uot c i tkcr  process Iinw cqunlly scrvccl her t u r n  P I tliitik tlint 
dicii we t h i s  press tliings Iiomc, wc Iicgiii to sc'u that  thcrc is grc:it 
rensoii to doubt  the  wisdorii of sIiciidiiig 1:irgcly on gignntio dcfciisivo 
works with tlic iclcn of our Lenten Uccts rccovcring thcrusclvcs bcliiiid 
thcni. 
I linvo tccii  considwing tlio cnsc of grea t  1inv:11 tnscs wit11 wliicli 
i t  is of irripcrinl ricccssity tliat coniiiiuiiic:itioiis should bc o p n ,  and 
wlicrc scvcrcd cou1munic;rtions nicnii loss of coiuuniid of the sen? 
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ant1 up of cmpirc :IS :L ccrtnin coiiscquciicc. Tlicsc grcnt 
1 oris (10 neat rcaIIy diffci. i i i  cliar:ictci- so f:ir :is I can SCC, tliougll 
tlicy (liflcr iii degree, froin wli:it.ri~* peiicr:illy q11cd coaling stations, 
tllnt is, ports of supply. If wc tliiiik of Gibmlt:ir, Ilnltn, ~clcrl ,  
Colombo, Siiign~iorc, niicl 110iig Korig, \W U S I I ~ I I J  rcgird tlicni as ports 
of supply for our Enstcrn t m d e r ~ ,  ns WCH as for our \vai*-sliips 
cllgng:c.ti in protcctiiig tlic~ii, and witliont going a t  all bcjoiid titat 
tlioiib.lit--icrh:iIis (i~ily iiicliitljiig tlic latter braucli of it--\ye 1i:ir.c 
s p i t .  ant1 nrc syicridiiig ciioriiioiis sums oii tLc local dcfrnccs of cncll 
pI:itc. \\'lint arc tIic 
conditions w e  nssunic to be prcsciit wlicii tlicsc works shall lie I r o n & ,  
iiito plny ? T l i c ~ ~  s ~ e n i  t o  iuc to bc I)ut tlircc possible scts of tLct,l. 
I:irst, tIi:it tiic cxistciice of tlic local ilcfcriccs slinll rict. :is such n sc:iro 
to tlic cncniy t h t  tlicj will ricvcr :ippronch. Sccond, tlint ivc Iiavo 
lost tlic coiiininiid of tlic mi, but could rtpi i i  it if oxily tlicsc Iil:iccS 
arc p ~ s c r r c d  to us. Third, t l int  though tlic plnccs slioiiltl not fnll,. 
ciitcrprising rnitlcrs might si~tl~lc~ily c u t  iii  niid (Itstroy tlic coal and 
other stores wliicli would lie, witliout local dcfciiccs, crposcd to 
nsrnults Insting too short n tinic to bc iiitcrfcrcd with uiilcss c r c r j  
'I'wJ of tlirsc pI:iecs, JIalta and Gibmlfnr. linvc Iinrl n history, nrid 
n third p1:icc of like st ixtcgical cliai~nctcr--JIiriorcn--briu~s in n 
history ncccssnrx to corriplctc tlic othcr two. 
TIic Iiistorr of 31aIt:i is qiiitc siniplc. Finncc with IL locnl commnnd 
of tlic sen, wliicli could not have csistcd in stcinin wnrfnrc, took 
possc~ssion of tlic placc. Tho Frciicli losing tlic corniiinud of tlic sen, 
Einiply iii conscqucncc of tlic ~ircscncc of n superior llcct, licld on to 
hlnltn from Ecptcnilw, l'iOS, for two jc:irs till Scptcriihcr, 1800. I t  
his iicvcr bccn tlircatciictl siiicc, but wc linrc i icvcr  siiicc lost flic 
coiiiiii:intl of thc Jlcditcrrniivnn Scn. ' lhc wliolc of our qirintions 
doring ol;r.conirnniid of tlie Jleditcrlmcnn wcrc (iuilcss we cxcept 
tlic siiinll ucc nindc of 1Iinorc:i in liOO) conductcd with uridcfcndcd 
b:iscs, gc1ier:illy opcw ronilstcatls. 
Nrnorc;i, by tlic joiut cffoi.ts of tlic Army niid tlic lzlcct, fcll into our. 
1i:inds in 1708. It was tlicn n diily fortificd plncc, but we wcrc in 
comniniid of thc scn. 'l'licii, 
as will Lc rciiicnil~crcd, Jlinorcn fcll as n conscqocnccof U j n g k  f i ' l  . 1 urc 
to wrcst tlio coriim:ind of thc sen frcni tliu French. Couiing hick 
into our liniids in liG3, \vc liclcl i t  till li6.2. 1:rolii tlic autbirnk of 
tlic war with Frniicc, i n  1778, wc lind nintlc n o  nttcmpt to kccp thc 
coii1ni:iiid of tlic Ilcditcrinncnn Sen. Our couinic'iw tlicrc wns of 
siucill :iwount, :tiid sucli as i t  wns, i t '  ninst Iinrc bccn nb:indoiicd, as 
tlic full forcc wc ninintniiiccl was but oiic 60-, oiie .jO-giin ship, 
2 fisigatcs, niid n slaop. W'iic~i S p i n  dcclnrd v n i *  in 17iO thcrc was 
notliing to prcvcnt Iicr bciitling nil licr cmcrgics to tlic rcaiptilre of 
Gibinltar arid 3linorc:i. Xcitlicr was tlirrc niiy rclicf for Jliiiorca from 
tlic scn, and i t  :iccordingly fcll in  Fchiinrj ,  l i@.  But n p i i i ,  we 
l i d  rchtord coniiiinnd of tlic sc:i in liD8, : i d  Aliiiorca bccnmc ours 
oiwc iiiorc, as 600x1 ns we desired it, \ v i t l i o i i t  tlic loss of n uinll. 
Here their nrc two plnccs, Niiltn rind JIiiiorc:i, both fcr tlicir timc 
\\'lint is i t  cxnctly tli:it wc arc niining at.? 
dcrclicc \YC)'C on the spot. 
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rcry strong plnccs, yct both following siiiiply tlic posscssion of 
sea. 'l'hnt tlic fortitications prolonged tlic sicgcs iri:iy bc ncliiiittccl, 
Lilt what must also bc nllowcd is, that thcsc p1:iccs could only bc 
nttnckcd by tlic Powcr wliicli lieltl tlic command of tlic s w .  111 tticsc 
iiistaiiccs then, i t  sccriis wo mirst iinrrow tlic fiirictious of fortifiattioils 
cloivii t o  preserving thc plnccs for n liiiiitctl tiriic nftcr tlic scn, :uid 
tlicreforc tbc coniniunicatioiis, ling bccri nlinndoiicd. \Vc cniiiiot coii- 
tcmpl:itc liriiigi~ig tlic fortificntioris of Malta into actual iisc until 
lvc Iinvc nbniitloiiccl tho JIct1itcrr;incnn nnd our E:istcrii con~mcrcinI 
route. 
I vcnturc to think that whcn grcat sums go into thc ivorks of 
Mnltn tlicrc is not a distinct rccogiiitioii t l i n t  wc nrc prcpnriiig to 
:rIinncloii tlic A1editcrimic:in route to IidiiL aud tlio wliolu of that line 
of conimcrcc. 
I bnvc nlrcndy mcu- 
tioiicd Iiow i t  fcll into oiir liiirids, :ind Iioir it wns kcpt in PUP 1i:inds i r i  
i ts carlicr (k ip ,  not LJ- tlic strength of its fortifiwtions, b u t  11) the. 
rclicving flcct of Sir  Joliu Lcakc, \die 3i:id his L:isu at Lisbon. 
Spain bciiig iii  1760, ns \vc Iinvc notcd, in conininucl o f  tlic scn, 
mndc n uiost dctcrriii~ied s c t  nt Gibrnltnr ns \vcll ns :it \I* A 1lIol'C:l. 
I bclicvc wo gcncrdly consiclcr that  tlic former pl:icc was prcscrwtl 
to 11s by i t s  stimgtli. Wc nir, iiot iil~v:iys rciiiiridcd tlint wlmt rcnlly 
prcscrvcd i t  wns tlic cinployiiicnt of tlic wliolc avnilaldc i i w t l  p o w r  
of England i n  1760, lFSl, and 116.3. In  cncli of tlicsc gcnrs it would 
I i n w  fallcii, jusi: ns Xinorcn fcll in thc lnst of tlieni, 1i:id not iuiuiciisc 
flccts bccn dispntclicd to covci. its rc-storing and rc-victiinlliii,n. 111 
January, 1760, S i r  George Roclncy, with fiftccn sail of tlic linc, nftcr 
i1cfr:itiug tlio Sjiaiiisli flcct, opcnccl cori1iiiuuic:itioris with Gibraltar 
nritl rclieved it. I n  hlnrcli, l i81 ,  Adiiiirnl DarLy snileil for tliu rclicf 
of Gibixlhr with iio less tlinii t\rcrity-ninc sail of tlic linc, iicar 
ZOO rictunllcrs, storc-ships, and othcrs. Ant1 conricctetl witli this 
flcct tlicrc is thc  rcmnrknblc fnct t l int  just :itout tlic timc tli:it it 
\\-auld liaro bccn off Urcst, Do Gi:issc was sailing with grc:it llcct 
and nrniy for  opcmtioiis against 11s in thc West Tndics. Siicli n 
ceiiiiciclciicc ought to m:ikc ns cstrcmcly cautious iii acting on tlic 
siippisition th:it fortifications will rclicyc our flccts. . 'l'liosc of 
Gil)idt;ir ccrtniulr did not. iii this cnsc. In Scptciiibcr, 1762, Lord 
lIo\vc snilcd with thirty-four mil of thc line mid nn inixticrise coii\-eiy. 
Tlic Ucct, cnpgi i ig  i i i  iI p:irti:il action with tlic Spnis l i  Bcct, for tho 
tliirtl tiiiic prcventcd Gibrdtnr froiii fnlliiig into their linnds. 
Wc xnny my, iiidccd \vc mist say, t h t  but for licr fortifications, 
Gibraltar would not iiow Lc in oiir posscssioii. n u t  w e  must also say 
that  line1 it becii iicccss:iry for us to limp up uiil)rokcn comiiiuiiicii- 
tioiis with Gibmltar, as i t  iioir woulcl Iic on nccoiiiit of our  t i d e ,  tlic 
fortifications \vonld iicvcr 1i:ivo Lccn c:illctl iiito nction ; i i r ic l  1i:td ivc 
not for tlircc sncccssivc yc:ii.s put oat our wliolc xinvnl struiigtli to 
rcliurc it, tlic fortificntions thcmsclvcs would not hnvc prcscrvcd it 
to 11s. 
Again, w e  secm to bc mct by tho conviction that fortifications cnii 
o~ i lg  rcprcsciit dclay. Th:it they nrc not of thcnisclvcs of usu to 
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a rnoring Nax-y, :is fortrcsscs on land may strengthen tho position of 
n moving Army by covcring i ts  flnnks, &c., but tlint wlicrovcr corn. 
niunic:itions m:ry bo g iwn  up, tlicy may en:iLlo n plnce to hold out 
until relicvcd. 
Somc tliouglits of a highly pamcloxicnl cliarnctcr will intrudo tlicm. 
sclvcs a t  this point. Gibrnltnr wns n very strong plnco wit11 n \-cry 
weak prr i so l i  when i t  fell into thc Ii:intls of S i r  Gcorgo Rookc. 
I h x n ~ s o  it \ ~ a s  n strong p1:ico i t  was cvcr aftcr ucccssnry to put 
within i t  n stroiig. garrison. At  n tinic whcn ,it wns iiot of tho 
slightest iisc to us, I t  exhausted our n:ivnl strength in its defence; 
l i d  it uot becn A strong plncc wit11 II grcat garrison w o  diould 
airn ly linrc evacuated i t  wlicri it was necessary to nbandon tlic 
Mcttcrmiicnu, just ns iri 1737 irc cvnciintcd the is1:iiid of Elba. W o  
ehould havo douc i t  in tho conscious~iess that i t  wonld fall back into 
onr linnds ns soon ns wo ro-occupicd that sen, niid tlic plnco Lccanic 
Considcriiig it to I N  mcrclj n dcpih for tlie supply of our war-ships, 
wo must note it ns nil cslinusted dcpiX-tlic slicll of a Jcp5t-unlcs;l 
wc  kept up  comiiiuiiic~tion with it. Tliat is to Lay, i t  coulcl not in 
niig v:iy linvo nssistcd us to rcjiniu tlic command of thc seia, f o r  wc 
rniist have p t  the cominnnd of thcsc:i lwforc we could rcstorc i ts  raluo 
11s :I dcl:bt. Tlicrc is, tlicrcforc, a cert:iiri d:ingcr in mnking n dcpht 
which is nccesnry to us too strong loaillj-, iis, slioulri it f:ill-as it 
iiiust i f  we nll~ldoll  tllc COnl~inIid of tlic suriwundinp sen long enough 
-tho fact of its stiwigtli may retard and hinder the rrstointion of 
our commnnd of the sen. Hnd thc Spniiinrds not o~igirially iiindo 
Qibixltai. atrong, we conld not lirivc hcld it when wc left that sea, 111:d 
S p i n  necd not lime cxbnustcd liersclf in fruitless cffor:s to get it 
Lack ngnic as LL necessary part of licr rcstorccl cornniaiid in thosc 
waters. 
I nm only using Gibrnltnr as nn illustmtion, not siiggesting iiiore 
with regaid to t h n t  particular fortrcss than to m y  that if our com- 
munications v-itli i t  nrc I I C C C S S ~ ~ ~ ,  the plncc must be licld b j -~cnr i s  of 
tlicse communicatioiis niid iiot by its isol:ctccl strciigth. :ind that tbc 
il1usti:itioii gorcrns nll n:iv:il dqibts-tli:it is, :ill mvnl basts which 
are not prociuccrs of navnl strength, but oiily rerjCicrrs of that strciigtli- 
dephts diicli in tlicsc d c ~ j s  of stc:im niu cliicfly rcg:irdcd as stores oi 
locomotivc foroc. 
TII tlic 
wars of tho pnst it ccrhiiily only slinrcd thc iniporimcc which, frorii 
the n:iv:d point of view, was Iicld b j  tho wlioll~ iiidefeiisiblc b:ises of 
Tctuan, Lngos Ihy, nnd P:ilinns Bay-. nut wcrc Gibi-nltar oiicc iiiorc 
i r i  tllc h:uirls of Spain, tho Iieccsitics of our casc \ronld proldily 
&tcriniiic tli:it if wu WCI’C to retain ou r  JIcditcrrancan route to India 
niid tlic East, vie slioiiltl repossess oiirsclvcs of it. It may iiot IIC of 
ndraut:i,nc to the Power ~vlioso life dcpcntls oii n frcc Emtern Iiighwny, 
Lilt it  iniglit bc iriipossible to ~I’CSCI’VC tli:it liigliwny frcc if tliu Powcr 
dctcriuiiicd to lmr it wwc in possession of Ciibi:ilt:ii*. 
I{cvc!rting IIOW to  tlie tlircc ri1tcrn:itivc functions wliicli might Lo 
asjigiicd to tlic forti8c:itiori of Alnlta, Gibrnltnr, and other dcpats on 
of restnred T ~ I W  to US. 
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a line of communicntion,wc do  not sccm jusiificd by history in assnm- 
i n s  thnt any fortification will act a% R scnrc to jircvcnt the  P o w r  
controlling tlic sc:i froin mnkiiig his attack. Secondly, we :ire linrdly 
justified in supposing that if wo lost t l iu  coi~~iiinrid of t lc Eastern 
route, tlicse clcpats liciiix still Iicld by 11s \vould ninterinlly assist 11s 
in regaining it, tlioiigli, nftcr w e  lind rc@icd command, tbcy woald 
bc of the smio use to us wliicli t h y  arc at. prcscnt, niitl this for tho 
simplo rensori that t h y  would Lo cxlioastcd dcpbts \vlicii IYC restored 
corniiiunimtion with tlicm. 
Tlierc rcniniiis t l iu  tliird function of foi*tific:ition, nnnicly, thc pien- 
tcction of tho stores-the protcctioii*of tlic clepBt propcr, atid riot tlic 
slicll of it-from thc sudden surprise and dcstruction wliicli miglit bo 
effected in R short time liy a srnall forcc. 
I think that tlic original claim for tlic local clcfcncc of our co:ilirix 
statims did iiot go further tlinii this. I ,think t l i n t  if tlic w r i t i u p  of 
tlic carlicst ndvocatcs of this incasiiro arc studied, it. will Lo seen t1i:it 
tho I:ist tliiiig tlicy Ilnd it! tlicir minds wns t l in t  conliiig stations slioulti, 
or could, stand doiic. Iudeed, I might :illnost go ns far 11s to say that, 
i n  ouc pioniiiicrit casc, thc couccption noiv lield 11s thc gciicr:il body 
is oxnctl - tlic reverse of tlint piit forwnrd more than 90 years ago, nlitl 
still held by him. Thc iden of preparation for scrcrctl coniiuuriicntioiis 
with R coaling station, which h i s  doiiiinntcd oiir nctuel policy witli 
regard to tliurii, \\-us totally nbscnt tlicii. The dcfciico siiggcstcd w s  
n loail sea dcfencc which \vould Iirqvciit coiiimuiiiciitioris bciiig cut by 
anything short of n considci.fililc forcc, for i t  was plainly felt that. a 
dcpbt mis t  eeasc to Lo II. dcpBt, mid must losc the wholc of its vnluu, 
if tlic strenrn of replcnishmcnt ceases to flow into it.. 
Think of Singnporc for R iiioiiieiit, simply as :L ri:i~al bnsc. ’ Oui. 
sqiindron comes in, exhausts the coal supply, niitl quits. .The enciiiy 
closes iwmcl, scizcs tliu collicis which would Iiam rcplcnislicd tlic 
cxlioustcd stores, tills up his own buiikcrs froin tliern, and citliw 
destroys the rest, or disptclies it to somc courcnicnt hiding-place. 
Our own squndron coiiics back, drives off t l iu  cncmy, arid finds nn 
empty coal dcpbt. So far ns our w:ir-sliips aro conccmcd, what dif- 
fcrciicc docs it makc wlictlicr Sirigaporc has nltogctlicr fnllcn or 
wlietlier on l j  tlic conl storc is ciiipty Y Our squadron tlicrc is poww 
less, while the ciicmy is left in psscssion of tliu sea. TLc fortificatioris 
linvc absolutely fuileti to hold ally rclat imis with tlic nioying i\T:i\y. 
T h y  Iiave nor. guarded its stores, ~ i i i d  tiicy cnuuot iti any way nssist 
i t  to rccovcr the columnrid of tliu sca. 
If, on tlic other I i :~ i id ,  a coal storo is very much cxposed, tlic 
strongest ~rorks iiiaj- Uc passcd by, nnd :ti1 twterprising cneiny 011 n 
dark iiiglit, with good storc of clyrinmite and couibustillcs. but with 
very little force, might in  nri hour or so dcstroy all tlic vduc wliidi 
the works Lad bccii crccted to gunrd. 
I think wliat took place with regard to Port IInniilton giws 11s a 
niost. useful iiicnsiirc of thc rcal 11:iv:iI tliought with rrg:ird to tlic tircil 
defences of R piircly naval depdt. Supcrfioinlly w e  should read it  
t h t  the X n ~ y  rcjcctcd Port 1l:imilton ns n dcpbt  unless it had bci-n 
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ot1icqyisc. And, still supcrficinlly, i t  woold nppcnr tlint. t h e  sole 
objection to  tlic unfortificd dCl)ht \\.oLild hnvo been tho iicccssity of 
dctncbinx ships, rcnlly reqiiirctl olsrwhcre, for its local giinrd. 
tlic nioincnt wc go Lclow tlio siirfwe wc f i i i d  the Covcrniiip 
tho+t of D diffcrcnt clini.;ictcr. Port IInniilton, if vnlunblc :is n 
l i :L~a~ bnso :it nll, vionltl linvc bccii cliicfly so for opcriitions ngninst tho 
~{ussian Sibciinu ports, such :IS Vlndirostock, iii the cvcnt of ~rni. .  
I h t  tlic iinynl instincts, restin:: on all tLc broad f:icts of naval history, 
clcclnrctl tlint siicli opcrations rcqiiircd n pi*climin:irr coniiuand of tho 
sen. Tlint if such cornmarid cristcd, uritlcfcndcd iinral bnscs mould 
Lc cstnblislicrl ns closc as I)nssiblc to tho SCCIIO of nction, niid P o r t  
1l:iniiltoii \voiild, i n  coiiscquciicc, fail to bo of nriy vnliic. 
1 he gcrici.nl conclusion arising s c ~ i i i s  to  bc tlint no moving Navy 
Iins c\*cr rcnlly Inid ;I. stress iiponforf+d liascs. Wlicn i t  i s  i n  c o u -  
iii:iiid of ilic sca i t  \rill alu-:iys scizc nnd hold convcnicnt bnscs, b u t  i t  
will rarely, if over, of itsclf, s ~ i c n d  much on tho  locnl dcfeiico of tho 
bnscs. Tlicir dcfcnco is iiirolrcd i n  tlic commnnd of thc scn. A 
iiioviiig X n v r  tilust e i ther  lie i n  comm:iiid of t.Lc sca, or IigLtiiig f o r  il. 
It Iioltls i t s  couiinaud by tliu sniiic tcnurc :is nii nriny docs, :ind ns two 
nrniics c:iriiiot corrimniid tlic snmu tcrritory, so rieitlicr can two Ilccts. 
If in n givcn fcrritory, tlic nrni: of oiic I)clligcrcrit cnniiot nttnck t h e  
fortrcss of tlic.otlicr wliilc tlic nrmr of tho otlicr is Lcsicgiiig niiothcr 
fortrcss of t h e  first ; so neitlicr CRII tlicsc things linppcn on tlio wntcr. 
Fortifications will slicltcr bcntcii, niitl, tlicrcforc, iiinctire tlccts, jiist 
as they will slicltcr bcatcii nrniics. l’l~riioutli and Portsiiioutli iiiiglit 
hcouic to our Euipirc nritl O I I Y  flrcts, n-hnt Xlotz nnd Paris wcm to tlic 
Frericli Empiio and nrniics--riicro rcccptncles for  shuttiiig up forco 
i i i ,  while tlic 1Smpirc wns bcing over-run. I do not tliiiik t h a t  1i:id we, 
t l i i r t r  )-cni-s ngo, rcg:!rtletl tlicin from this point of ricw, wc slioiild 
liavo spciit ns inucli on the i r  locnl dcfcnws 11s wc hnvo cionc. 
As rcg~rds coriinicrcinl ports arid out-ports, wlictlicr nir:il bnscs or  
not, I tnko it ns plniri t.Lnt. crory nerve iiiust be stnlincd to scciiro our 
comruunicntioiis with tlicm iii wnr, and tlint i t  is cstrorncly dilticult t o  
defcnd the  cxpcudituro of n n j  moncr  on 1oc;il dcfciice iint.il tlic 
conimiinicntions nro nholutcly scciirc. II‘Iien tlic commiinic:itions 
nrc secure, tho provision of local defcrico on tlic snppositioii tha t  they 
:ire iiot secure, bccomcs somcwlint nnoinolous. 
n u t ,  on tlic otlicr Iinnd, ontlyiiig proprrty of vcrj- grczt vnlne lcft 
ccry niiich csposetl, i s  D direct tc~nptat ion t o  tho nttnck of it. d 
I I n l t n  dockyard without niiy dcfcricc at  nll, nnd cnlxiblo of bcing g o t n t  
niid destroyed i n  n fow hours by a couplo of dashing criiizsrs, would Lo 
such n tcniptntion ; ns wc xniglit p r c s n p p s o  tlint our comni1iiiic:itions 
\vouId iiot nltvnysi bc so closc :is to  make it, absolutely ccrtnin that  
t l iwc iniglit no t  bc linlf-n-dozcn hours whcii no opposiug cruizcr 
of o u i ~  would bc citlicr iii port or i n  +lit. 
h i t  wlicn rre are dissntisficd 
with II 3I:ilta (1ocky-d wliicli wc ndiiiit i s  :I tortiptition only to IL g r e a t  
bnttlc flmt aid  n heavy lniiil forcc, nnd wlicri KO proposc to spcnd 
Iicavily 011 tho works protccting it,  i*ntlicr tlinn on mniritoiiiiiig c o w  
muiiicntion with it, tlicri wc arc, I think, looking not at tho prescrva- 
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tioii of our Empire, but n t  its disrnption. Wc must bc'contnmplriting 
thc nbandonmcnt. of our routc to 1iicli:L tG tlic Jlcditcrixiicnn fiii*somL. 
iiidcfiuitc timc, nnd w e  niust Lo contcniplntiiig citlicr tLc ultiiiiiitc loss 
of J[:rltn, or tlic czcrtion of tlic wholc of our  iiarnl p m c r  at intcrvtils 
for its relief ant1 rctcntion, nll at n timc wlicii IVC cannot makc tho  
sliglitest, iiso of it, and nrc, Ly tlic liypotlicsis, (lcspcmtcly ptcsscd clso- 
whcrc. 
I should obscrrc that :ill tlic stcam wars confirni tlic tcacliing of tho 
s:iiliiig wnrs, rcspccting fortifications. Tlicj liarc iicvcr stood n 
dctcrniined attack froin tlic sen ; t h y  linrc Iicvcr given, or rcstorcd 
thc commnnd of the scn; but tlicr linvc slicltcrctl Ic:itcii and infcrior 
flccts, stiinll niid lnrgc, just ns tlicy did in tiiiics guiic bj-. 
. n n t ,  on tlic otlicr Iinnd, l)oiict-\\'illnnnicz carrictl on liic nnrnl ~ r a i *  
in 1870 from t h e  wholly undcfciidcd bnscs of Laiigclnnd rand Kiojc U A ~ ,  
cvcu as we had, 15 jcars Lcfore, cari-ictl on oiirs froin tlic uiidcfciidcd 
clopat of Nnrgcu, and :is Kclson Ii:id, 70 p a r s  bcforc, airricd it on 
froiii t l iu  niicliongu of Nednlcnn. 
As I said n t  tlic opciiing of niy pqxlr, I did not think wc could do 
mom with sodifticult n qiicstion as tliis, tliaii suggest wap of Iookiiig 
n t  it. I t  will l)c nppnrciit that mj- way of looking nt i t  tc~ids to lint 
w r y  great rcstric:tiaiis on tLc cstcnsioii of lixcd WOAS and of local 
dcfeiiccs of tiny kiritl. I linvc ciidcnvoiircd to look at  tlic runtrcr nll 
roiiiid, nnd whcrcrer I foriiicd nri opps i tc  ric\v, to  ciidcnvoiii* to ~JI'CSS 
i t  iioiiic.to its couscqiici~ccs niid scc w1i:it they c:inie to. I l i ~ v ~  iiot 
atlvcrtctl xiiucli to t lic locnl dcfcncc of purdy coriiriicrcial ports, bccaasc 
I cannot sliakc n i p 9 f  clcnr of tlic coiiriction tlint it is tlic comiiiuni- 
eitions nloiic of tlicsc t1i:it nrc worth dcfciiding. nnd tliat wliile tlic 
ports nrc nothing without tlicm, tlic dcfcricc of tliciii includes, in- 
cxornbly, tlic tlcfcnco of tlic port itsclf. It  is i t  incre instinct with 
IUC which ndmits light Lattcrics n t  tlic cntronccs of s u c h  ports. I 
cantlot, whcn I fncc it, rcccincilc thcir csistctlco to my rcnson. 
Ocncml I:~SKISE : Jn  rising to opcii the cliiciissian on tho Tery iniportniit nncl 
nble pnpcr to wliicli mc haw jur t  listcncd, I slinll iiot ottenipt to enter into uiiy 
lcngtliciird criticism of clctnils, but would 11rcfc.r to conline tlic fcrr rciilnrls that  I 
linrc to riiakc to the gencnl  linc of nrguiiicnt wliicli scriiii to pervade tlic paper nb 
wcll n$ ninny rcccnt writing3 nnd uttcmnccs on 1110 snnic rubjcct. That Iinu of 
nrgiiniriit ~niglit be. pcrlin 3 I inight ray boldly sintcd i i i  somedint the followiiig 
v n j  : - ~ i c  constriiction o r  fortifications for tlic protcction of oiir iinvnl ursciinla. 
niitl the organitntion of land forces for tlic dcfci:cc of tlie co:iits of tho Uiiitcd 
Kingdoin, nre ur i i icccsiq.  For in tlic rrciit of o w  bciiig riigngctl in nnr wit11 niiy 
Europain l'owcr or n combination of P o w r i ,  oiic or otlicr of two thin;* W O U I ~  
hopiicn: citlicr oiir flccts would hold tlic coiiiiii:iritl of tlic rcaj o r  the? woiiltl fail 
to c!o so. 111 tlic first rase, that is to  snj, if oiir flccts Iiold tliccoiniiiand of tlic scn, 
an riv'ntioii of tlic Unitcd Kin,ndoiii would iiot tnkc pI:ic~*, ni the cnciiiy \roiiltl r.ot 
dare to nttciiipt i t  (we sliall nearly nl l  of iis ngrcc to t l in t  1 tliiiih) ; niid in tlicsccontl 
case. t1i:it is to 'a?, if our flcets 11x1 lost the co~iiin:ind of tlic ern. nii iiirnsion woiild 
not tnPc pl:icc, lccniiic the cneiiiy would not troiiblc I i i i i i . ~ r l f  to  lniicl aforcr u~miiour  
shores i~inriii~icli u$ Iic roiild bring us to siibiiii~sioii tliroug~i the  iriztriiiiicnLiIit~ of 
rtnrrntion. Xow, I \voiild nrli n'lint ia tlic lo,oic:il conclusion froiii tliesr rt:itciiiciit* ? 
Is i t  not i l i n t  n c  linrc in part tinics rqiinndrrcd ninny iriillioii, n i i d  org:iiiizetl Intgc 
forcci for tlic 1iiir110-e of prcrcntingnii inrnsioii n-liicli could iicvcr tnLc ~ i l n c u  ? A i d  
further, iioiv t1i:it \\e hnvc bccn brought to our SCIIICZ. ouglil H C  not to dimniitlc our 
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dcfcncc? I think if siiclin pro1ros:il \\crc rnntlc to tlic piiblic it aoulil ritlicr startle 
t h i n .  Tllr! 
only answer !lint I can conccirc woiilil be t1i:it tlic public nrc not ~ircli:~ri*d to ns*.ctlt 
t o  tlic i t l q  that cvcn if oiir flwt wcrc ili$:iblcil i t  uoiilil bc poseibll: to iirstitutc 
coinlilctc lilocfodcof tliu Uiiitctl Iiingiloiii PO i i< to prcrcnt tlic ingress of tlic vi*wcl, 
which n-oiilil bc rcrcsiry to bring i i i  oiir food ciiyiplg. Of coiirdc cvcn n pnrtio1 
blocLnde uriilcr tlic circuinctnnci-s I linrc nirntioriril svoiilil bc t i  rnodt cnlniiiito11s 
c r r n t  : i t  woultl rntnil rnijcrg nlmost bc~oriil tlixription on ninnj  Iinrts of oiir 
110 ulntion i i i  fact, tlic inrrc tlioiiglit of siirli nii cvciit nankrn j  rrry dis:igrccnble 
tccfiiigs; b t t  n j  to its bring tlic mmns of ini1urin:: iis to n t  oncc tlirow l i p  tIiPS!xIflFc, 
1 think ! l int  !lie public i j  riot ~irrli;irciI to ncccpt riicli n ricw. If n Iinrtinl blocknde 
l l u t  wli j~l ioi i ld  it tlo FU if the pri>por:il bi* foiinilrtl on sounil r w m i  7 
linil tlint H C  1i:itI rlonc NCU if wc Iind p r c r r r r i l  tlic fortiGrationj of our  rin\n1 
nrrcrinls nnil tLc lniid forcrs on which N C  rclicil for fhc dcfcncc of oiir roasts. TLo$e 
furcc4, if properly orgnnircd, could Lrcp tlic cncniy nt bay nt 1111 crcnts for n E l l l ! i -  
ticntly lorig tiiiic to cn:iblc oiir sqiinilrons to rrlit, but  of roursc (lint t~oiilil not  bc 
posiblc  iiiilrrs our  nnrnl iirsnnlr l i d  bccri Lrpt intnct nll tlic tiriic, und tlint can 
only br doric by for t iki t ions crcctcd for tlicir drfciicc. I think, iii spcnLing of 
t l i i ~  subjrct, wc sliuuld not 1c:irc ou t  of iiglit t l i i t  i t  is uot iii nccordnncc with tlic 
spirit of this nntiori, tliiit tlic fort of our flrrts linring bcrn worEtriliri thc  oiitsct of 
n war mould Imd us imriicdintrlF to succuriib to circunirtanccs; oii tkc  r o n t r q ,  r~ 
wc nrc pretty irrll n m r c  !lint twr is n r r ry  unrrrtnin gattic, wkctlicr it be ~ n g c d  on 
land or at. sea, mn should be incliiicd to hold out  till the h r t ,  nrid E ~ I O U ~ ~  bo rrr)' 
f i l d  to knrc for !lint purpusc tlio lnnil dcfcnc.cs wliicL tlic co i in tv  11.1s tip to tlic 
prczrnt iiiniiitoinrd in n Wore or less propcr stntc of rfflcicncr. It is riot rnfc, I 
h o w ,  to uttrr proplircics, but I rrnturo to prrdict on tlic prrscut occnzion t l in t  tlic 
conclusion of this discussion on which me nrc now rntcriiig will bc soiiicwlint to tliid 
cll'cct-tlint fLc nnr111 forcrj of count r j  should, in tlic Grst instnncc, ho nttcntlcd 
to;  !lint t l i c j  should bc kr t up in  n stntc of sririigtli nrid rflicicncy which would 
cnsurc, ns far ns p w r  mortnys r;in control tlic future, our  su~i rcn~ac .~  nt scs ; but  t l int  
a t  tlic mine timc it woulil bc unwisc to tlispenic with tlie forti1:cntionj of our  nariil 
nricnils nntl with tlic land forcrs which wc linre now nt  our tlisliosnl for tlic tlekncc 
of our coasts. 
Ociierul Sir LOTIIIAS SICHOLSOS, K.C.Il., Inspector-ff c n c n l  of Fortifications: I 
mu3t l int  bo nllowctl to pay tny tribute of pr:iisu to tlic lcctiirer for the cxtrriiicly 
Ailful any i n  wliicli he  I i n j  Iinntlled !lie siibjcct. \\'lien n rirnii of AdiiiirJ1 ColoiiiL'r 
cnlibru stnvile up nntldrlivcrsIcctiircs of tliij  sort it ijqiiircccrtniii !lint lie ttillberiot 
only nttericlrtl tu,biit Iic nil1 t o n  p*:itcxtciit riilcpiiblio opiiiioii. 1 do not lrmlio~c to 
follow Acliiiiral Coloinb tliroiigli rill tlic iliiTrrciit n rpnicn ts  11int Iic Ii:is u d .  I niny 
rliortly my t1i:it I tlo riot iigrcc with tlirui nor  do 1 tliiiili t h i n  liigicd. I think, it1 
fiict, t h t  Ailiiiiml Coloinb l i n j  ncliicird tlic rrditrfio nd absurdtiin. Sow,  1 do not 
pruporc, ns 1 Iinvc riiiil, to pull ! t i  I)irccr Ailniird Colouib'j lrcrurc ; niy objcct will 
bc iriorc to  i idi l r r r~ niyfclf to tlic policy oftlicIcc:iirl*. It is gitcn tit n rritic;tl tiiuc. 
A t  t l i r p w i t  rnoincnt tlic nxtion i 3  dirt to ti.c writs of i t 3  ilrfcncrj, and iiiiiongd 
n:iviil iiiid iiiilitnry riirn tlicrc ir u roiizrnsiis of opinion !lint \ \ l i n t  is wnntetl is ~ h c  
strciigtliciiiiig of tlic S;iry. I ronnot but think t1i:it this irirctiiiy will ngn'c witlt 
rnc in frcling t1i:it iinlcss !lie ti:irnl dcfmcrs of ~ng1:iiiil nrc srciirc, tlicrc is thngcr 
to oiir lirnrtlis :in11 Iioiiirj. Iliit I r t  115 look u t  thc liiltorj of thcsc thing:'. IVc linrc 
brrri t rwting tlicronibiriril drfrricrs of tlic Arniy nnil Snry n3  onr. For long :cars 
igiiormice prciloiiiinatcil. Tiriic \\:is wlicn I joiriril ! l ie Srrrirc, tlint ttic nnriil ~ i i n n  
o r  tlic ar t i l l r r~i t inn u o s  nctcr  nsLril liiJ opiriiuri iipoti tlic ilcfcricc of this coiiritrr ; i t  
u n r  lcft to tlir cnginrcr, nrid Iic rnrricd i t  out ncroriling to liir lights. Coinpnrc 
! l i n t  with what it is now. Tlic rngiiiccr c:irrics out  uiorc or  lcsj tlic ricws of tliorc 
iiicn u i t h  ulioni Iic is nssorintcd. Tlir nrtillrrjmnri atid tlic nnvnl uiiri nrr: con- 
riiltcil n.s to ntint i j  rrqiiisitc for fortifimtionj ; t1i:it is thc condition of things ut 
t h o  pr iwnt  tiiiie. [ egrcc with ;\ilniinJ Cclonib ( l int  if tlic Trcasiirr list i3 oiily 
ol'cti to O I W  Scriicc !lint Scrvicc intist b r  tlic Siivy ; niiil I for one slioiild rirust uii- 
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bclicre tliat we liare fallen SO 10s t l in t  tlic Snrj- nlorie can bc strcngtlicncdnndtllot 
tlic xlriiiy onel the ilcfeiirer crf this coiititrj itre to bc starved. h'ow. grntlenicii, wllat. 
is the iogieil c o n c h i o n  of tldr lccture? It nppmrr to me to  bc this : tha t  lye, 
niilitar? otid ci\iliaiis alike, are to 81311d on tlic shores of our land nnd watch tllc 
Xarr lighting the  enemy, to trvitltllc our  tlriiiubs in ar i r ic t j  that the  s a v y  i i i y  be 
rictorioiir, bc-caiisc, uiile.ir it is, tlicrc is notliiug bcliiiid. The i l lmt  Acliiiirol ]ins 
pmcticxlly tolil you tliat inntl c1rfeiices are of no we,  and t l i c r e f k ' i t  n ) p a r s  to ina 
tlint as Gcrirr.il Krdiinc Iinj $aid, IItc be& thing would be to disarm tile forts nn(1 
disbniitl our Arm . SOW, I do not tliiiik t h t  tlic countrr would cvcr li:ten IOEIICII 
a cmclii.pion ns t L t .  I n  n few wonlr I r1lotilii ~ i ~ c  to Ear wlint n l j  o w n  view ir. 
A t  tlic Iire.-ciit tinic tlic dcfcncc of tlic I<ing~loin 113s diridrd itself into t u o  parts- 
onc i j  n n \ d  sulircinacy, tlicotlier is the protcctiun of ccrt:tin ports untl certain cod. 
ing stitioiis a t  the riiost iniyortnnt lrnrtr of tlic Einpirc. IYitIi tlic first, I, ns n 
soldicr. d o  iiot prcwinc to intcrfcrc ; tlic 113~31 wan olonc can giro nti opinion upon 
wlint the nuval sitprciii:tcg of Eiiglaiitl s l i~uld  bc, a i d ,  tlicrcfcrc, i t  tvoiild Iiardlv bc 
bccoiiiiiig iii n inilitnry won to give UII  opinion u p i i  n 6ubj~ct  of that sort. But ivitlt 
rcgyd to tlic wcond, tlic ucccssitj for dcfcoding certain garrisons, nntl certain codiiig 
stutiotis, for t l i i i t j  ycirs liavc wc bcen about tliia work: !or thirty jcars linrc tlrc 
bed iiitcllcctr of tlic Ariiij  ntid thc Xarj bcm dircctcd t o t r a d j  this oiic p i n t  ; 
for tliirt? !cars liarc Comuiistions sat, and I nui 1inppj to rec that  I.00nl Ciirnarron 
is lierc to join, I hop ,  iii this di.zcussioti : for thirty jcnrs liar tliere bccii 'D Coin- 
niittw sitting nt the U o ~ c  Guards to consider this qucdtioii of defencc, and upon 
every o w  of those Couiiaittccr hns tlic X u v j  bccn anipl5 represrntcd, and thcre Ii:is 
ke i i  n eonmi:ur of opiniou n i  to =lint thew tlefcnccj shoultl be. Xos I ask !on, 
is i t  wire to iiitcrferc at  such a critical time a) tliir wit11 n iiiovement wliich Inijzelf 
bclievc ir going forivunl to o r c r j  s u e r c d u l  is:uc? I do not wkh, us I horr  said, 
to  criticize tlic different points in dcliiiird Coloiiib'e qrec~li. I Lore no doubt that 
tltcrc will Ic fouud plcnt j  of l m p l c  ~ l i o  \rill be nblc to take up and criticize tlic 
different p.irts of it, 1 hare no doubt tlrnt tiierc uro coiiic poplc who nil1 bc found 
to  ciiiplin~ire tlic oh'cctionj nliicli he 11:~s r:iisd to tlic prczciit condition of things. 
I rnrclf, rcgurding t i c  h i g ~ i r r p o ~ i c y , s ~ i o i i ~ i ~  ricw \s i t11 grc.it rcgrct t ~ i o t  it  s l iou~d go 
fort to tlic public that there arc iii:irig pi.oplc in this n > m n b l j  s l io  hnrradvocatcd 
i n  rtrong tcruis tlie r i c w  wliicli tlic gnllutit Adtninl Iioldr. 1 might saj  Iwre t l i n t  
tlra prcri i3 tlic ciiief o r p n  for tlic diascniiiintion of tlic o inions wliicli are vcnti- k t r d  in tliir aj,cliiblg. but wlint Iinppcns 7 Tlic "Tiincr' I nnd otlicr pn1icrs nil1 
ublisli tbc wliolc of Adiiiinl Coloin~~'s spcecli, but iu short pnngi:tplis will oiily i e  r rcountd  t ~ i c  ol+xtions of tliorc people wlio maj  niae  perfectly ralitl objections 
to parts of what lie 1133 rnid. Thus the public Lcar one riew of tlic mse, tliry do 
noL licar tlic otlier. Thcrc 
arc one or trio lioiiit3, Iiowcrcr, that I sliould like to rcniarl; u p u .  The pliant 
di1riiir.l has quotcvl liiitorj, lie has brought for\varll instnticcr otir utter nnothcr to 
prore liij caJe, but  it alrpc~ra to  me that the traditions of old tiinel arc verj  little 
guiile to \\lint m i s t  takc plncc i i i  the  da 5 to e ~ u i c  ; I sar tlint tlicre ir alinost as 
niucli (IiKercnn. betwecu tile rcszc~s of t i ,  Criinmii IYar and tile ironclnc1 of to-doj 
a3 betwren tlic trjrcriies of tlic Romans ond tlie old sniliiig r e d s  of tlic days gonc 
b r  ; I say tlmt \vl~cri tlic iiaral uioii of old \ciirj left liir liarbow, all Iic liutl to think 
nbout was tlint lie iliiglil LK: d c  from n Ice-shore, ntid Lecp tlic wcntlicr guigcof his 
enciiig : 1111 Ire carccl ubout \rus to uiate tlic bc>t u ; i ~  lie could after liis cncnij, nnd 
to light li irii  c r t i d  to sink him if Iic coultl. Tlic cnsc 
iiow ir  tlint crcry r:iilor who lcurcs liir port must c;ilculntc upon tlic c o d  sttpplj that  
Iic 11113 iri I i i j  biiiikcrr. Ile cnunot in:ike n h r  hi, eiiciny in tlic s:iIiic IWT tliat t l ic j  
did in old dujs,  but Lc iuust cnlculate t l iu niiioiint of ru:il wliic11 kc will'liarc in his 
buiikcrj n.licri Jic iiicets his foe. l)ocs tliut not tiltcr tlic position of things? I tliint 
i t  niahcj 1111 thc diffcrcncc in the world. Atlrnir.11 ColoiiiL Iiaa, J think, n t l ic r  cx- 
aggcmtcd tlicetntr'mcutluaclc by Omcrd Echa\v in tliijruoiii: Iicstntcd tliattlirre\vas 
6W,oOo1. requircclfor tliecoiiiplctioiiof tlictlcfrnccsof l'l~tiioulli. dtlui inl  Coloniblias 
forgotten the fact that  that sutii coiiqrriwd fortihntioiis it is trite, but i t  al$oiiicliidcd 
tlrut wliicli is iiifinitclr more espciirire-tlie nrm:iuieiits tiiid the umuiuiiition-the 
armatnetits, wliicli is us i i c c e z ~ ~ r ~  for tlic fleets ar it is for the 1.ind defences. I miirt 
deprecate in tlie strougeat teriiis ut i i i j  d k p d  the  setting forth of the pwtcoiions 
In tliat, I consider, is R r e r j  grcat element of d q p .  






























of onc Scrricc to tllc dctrimcnt Of nIIOtliC?, l r c  r:nrnl nnd ndi tarp mcn nM ad- 
drcdjinfi olirsrlr~.r to onc object. W o  (10 not wish to contcnd for tlic bcncfit of tlic 
ollc to tilc ( lc t thci i t  of the othcr. ~ V C  arc! only doin: that which wc bclicro tho 
couiltrr reqliircj of ~3 ; KC aro only trring to c:irryout t o  n s u c ~ c ~ ~ f ~ l  issiic nll  tlint 
snici,. of oiir common nation reqiiircs, nnd, I think, for t h t  rcason w c  iiiust do 
\\lint VC can to liidc froni tlic public any diffcrcnccs if wc Iiarc tlicni ; but should 
\ve, illlfortiin:itcly hare tlicni, let us t ry  by nll iiicnns to uirct cacli otlicr oncoinmon 
p i i i i d  ; 1ct us t ry  to como togctlicr and co-oprate  ns miicli ti3 wo porsibly can for 
O i i r  Couilnnii miintry’s good. 
T ~ I C  Right Llon. thc Erac OF CARSAI~TOS : ir Frcdcrick Stcplicnwnnnd gcntlc- 
IIICII, JOU nrc  r e g  good to  call tipon iiic to eontribiitc what littlc I can s w  to  
tliis most interesting discussion, tIioiigIi, ns n civilian, I naturally fccI p a t  J i c .  
clciicc in nddroj ing a n  niidiciicc di ic l i  I know i j  co largely composcd of profej- 
rioiinl cxpcrt.!, nnd nicn so \rcll r-.lciilated to  cqin.:s n public opiniou on such n 
6ub.icct. I iiad, howerer, thc iidrnritngc, Sir, of bein: connectcd for iouic ycars 
witli n Coiiiniision which wnj niitliorizrd to iiiqiiirc into our  dcfcnccs abroad. I t  
Icd iiic to look rcry closely into tlicsc quc3tiotis, nnd I ~ I U  bound to 631 tlint tlic 
oliiiiion tlint I tlicri f o r i l l d  does not  concur with tlic ricw3 nliich the gallint 
Atliiiiral hns sct forth with EO iriucli nbility this crcriing. I \rill not of coiiric 
eiitrr upon what is redly the h g c r  half of tliij  qiirstion, tlic clcfcnccs of our 
nrsciinls aiid our own coinnicrcial ports. I nni afraid I must dispow of tlic onc by 
s:i~in:,. tlint t1ic.r nrc oiily rcry pr t inl ly  nriiicd, ~ i i d  of tlic second that  they nrc 
nbsdictcly clcfcncclcts n t  present. I woiild ratlicr iii tlic fcrr otscrrations which I 
\\oitltl niakc qmik of tlioac forcign ~tntioii3 with which I niysclf nnd tho r e r  
nblc Coiiiuiijiioii which nclid with inc wcrc cni w c r l  to .dcal. I npprcliciic{ 
putting i t  in pcrfcctly civilian nnil iintcclinical fnsgon, thc  dzfi-iwc of tiit! Enipirc 
cuiisists mlly of two things,-tlic drfcnw of oiir liomc sliorcs on tlic onc h:ind I 
nud tlic dcfciicc of our coiiiiiicrcc iiflont on tlic otlicr, for our coiiinicrcc ir our lifc 
and bcing ; nticl if i t  be dcrtrojcd o w  crcdit. nrid rcsoiircrj pcrijli with it. I fully 
siibsrribc to tlic doctrinc wliicli 113s brcn laid down Iiwa to.niglit, nntl clrcwhrrc, 
that our flrit liiic of dcfcncc i3 tlic Snry : nrid xuorc than tlint, I think \YC linvc 
bccn liring in  a st:itc of-I Iinrdlj likc to usc tho words t l in t  wcrc on iiij l i p ,  bu t  I 
will ~ a y  wu linrc lirccl for ~ o m c  ycars inn fool’s pradisc ,  trading on our p i s t  rcp’i- 
tation and uttcrlr dcficicrit in the ncccsmry iiimns of self-protrction. \Villi rc- 
g:int to the IICCCSV~~J- nuiouut nnd clianctcr of our nard dcfcnccs, I will oiily € 3 ~  
tha t  tlic Cummission of which I l i d  thc honour to  bo the Clinirninn, linring to  
examine incidcntdly nnd collatcrnlly iuto that  Euhjcct, ~ i n e  to  n distinct and 
decided opiiiion ou tho subjrct, nud rcprcsciitcd to tlic Oorcrnincnt of tlio dny, 
and conwqiiently to  tlicir succcssorj, that  in our opinion tlic i iard dcfcnccr of tho 
coiintrg trcro inadcquatc for the purposc, nnd 1 nccd not s:iy Iiow gmrc  such 3 
stntrment \rug. B u t  I p s 3  to 3 rccond brmch of this q:ir-.tioii, tlic protection of 
oiir c ~ i u ~ i ~ c r c c  afloat. Xow, Sir, tlic ricrr of tlie Coniniisrion \\:is this : that inas- 
i,iiicli I13 tlicrc m r o  grtat lincs of English coninicrcc of incnlciilablc rnluc, to bc 
rrgistcrcd not  by liundrcdj and tliouands, but pcrlinps bp iiiilliotis of pounds in 
T ~ I U C ,  that it  n s  of iiicstitnablc itnportancc that  wc should lioltl tlic coininanding 
p i n t s  dong thosc p a t  sc3 routed. By some str.iiiZs nr.ci:lcnl of fortuno tlio 
pr i i ic ipl  of those gorcming point3 hare fallen into tlic h:inds of this countrr, and 
it StCl l i3  to 1110 to  bo dniost mxlncsa not to t d i o  tlic full nclr;iiitn;r: of tlicm. And 
ict inc obscrro that d i m  pcrsons talk of tlic Tn3t c s ~ ~ r i i s c  to which t h t  Icads u). 
I \rould obscrre this is w r j  CxagScrtitcd hngunqc. Tlic c x p n r c  of dcfcnding tlicso 
conlinq st:itions i 3  rca11j of tlic most modcntc  dc.Gcription : atid looking to tlic 
ohjrct wliicli is in Tica it bcars no kind of proprtioii to it. Thc ot imatc  which tho 
Coiiiiiiissioii niarlc of tlic cxpcnsc rqwsents  in round iiutubcrj not wry much inoro 
tlt:m the cost of two l n r p  ship3 of svnr of tho Iircscnt &iy. I lcnrc i t  tliercforo to  
t l ia  coiiiiiioii sciisc of such nu nurlicncc ns tliij, wlicthcr it i, rcnroxiblo to shrink 
froin such nn outlaj, tho abrcncc of wliidi maynicaii tlic losr of tlic bcst part of 
oiir muiincrcc nfloat. Sow, Sir, a h a t  is i t  tlint innkc3 thrsc coaling stations and 
forciqii defcncc3 so rnlunble 3 I apprchcnd, spcnkinn rou,olily, gcncmlly you might 
rla+sify tliciu pwtty much under these Iica113. i k t ,  i t  is iiitcnded by thew 
coaling Ztatiolu that  th iy  shouId sct the Queen’s flect iu t h c x  dirtant parts of thc  





























world frcc to  opcrntc n3 nnral policr ninr dircct. Sccondlr, after nn nction they 
cnnblc: our f l e c k  iindcr tlic sccnrity of tlic gimr G f  tliosc tlcfcntlcd stations to refit 
and to rcpnir. 1 1 : ~  nnybdy Crcr caosidcrzd WIIAC tho CIpcnsC, Clit~iCultJ, lm- 
possibility, rvoultl bc of sendin: l~onio from an cnornioui tli+t:ince sonic of our largo 
1iicn.of-w:ir in ordcr to rclnir and to rcllt? lh i r J Iy ,  it  would enoblc t l ~ c  Qurrn’s 
slii ij iiot ouly to refit niitl r c p i r  but to cod, nntl, nr Sir Lot11i:in Sicliolaoii rerr 
tru\F s:iid, coil unclcr prcsciit conditions has brcoiiie tlic vcrx life of a ship ; she 
cannot ~iiorc without it, she is ahrolutely dclwiilciit ulmo” it, : i i d  lurtllcr, every one 
knoa3 wcll t l u t  \vliem.is our Gr&class comnicrci:il s h i p  can carry and do c;irrF a 
very lnrgc amount of coal, the Quccn’s rliip3 cm cirry but II rcrj liniitwl qinntity. 
I iut  fiirtlicr, j u s t  in  tlic s:iiiie WRY tlic3c coalin,n st;itiolic :iffon[ slicltcr to  Our coin- 
iiiercial nary, wlicn clintcd by prirntccrs or purziietl by ciirriiio, tlicy take rcfugo 
rindcr thc  jiuiii of tliosc fortr. In  the s m c  \tar, too, t h y  nre cn:iblcil to co.11, nnd 
if thi3 dcfcucc be not gircn l o  than,  it is tilmo& ccrl:iin tlinteitlivr two.tliirds of tlic 
coninicrcial iunrine must bc laid lip on tlic oittbrcok of war, innrm:icli 113 tliej 
would not be adcquntc in  point of spccd to cicnpe the h s t  cruizerj of our cneniicj, 
or, on tlic other Iiand, wc slioiild scc two-tliinli of tlieiii trmrfcrrrtl to a f o r c i p  
flag. It must be bornc in Ininil tlint in 1111 prob.ibility tlic days of convoyitig a 
nierclinnt tlcct arc p:issccl. Lnztly, wc iurist not forgct t h t  dcfcnilctl stntions l u r e  
tlic tcnclcncy a t  a11 erents pcntly to dctcr u i i  cnciiiy’s cruitcrs. A forcigq ship of 
wnr will, I nppn.licnd, think twicc niid thrice bclorc s11c nttciiipts to force a rci5011- 
nbly nrnird dcfcndcd stntion. Slit would run tlic riik of injury to licriclf ; tlic 
crrtaiii ri3k of a rn j t  espndi ture  of licr cod, a i d  h $ t I ~  tlic risk of an cs~iendi tuw 
of licr nnimunition, nnd nll this nt. a dishuco froni licr o m  bow. 0 1 1  all tliesc 
grounds tlic Cornphion  with which I m i 9  conncctcd tliouglit tlint tlicsa conling 
st:itioiis offercd r c r j  p a t .  adrantagcj both to the Quccn’s Sary nnd nl+o to our 
coiiiiiicrcinl niorinc. But I nius: take the l ihcr t j  of q i n g  tliis, t l int  if tlieso for t j  
nre not rcnsonnblg e uip d end defend4 i t  would be better tlmt wc sliould not 
toitc1l tlicni nt  311. 8 n  tKt I entertain a rcry clcnr opinion. you n w l  fur tllerc 
positio113 not mcrclj fortr, but  jou’need the  guns to put into tlioie forts, iind xou 
nccil tlniucd piinners ant1 prr i ion3 to clcfcnd tlicni : and if 1011 nre not prep:ircd to 
go to tlint niiioiint of prepmtion i t  i, bctter that ~ o i i  should not  ~rnr tc  tiuic nud 
iiioiicv upon n fruitless untl pcrlinps inijcliicrous objcct. And yct nr n uiattcr of 
kict ilint I nni ufriitl i3 rzallr tile prc:-cnt Imdioii of tliiiigj. wc I I ~ Y C  3 cnn- 
sidcnblc number of these st:if ion3 in which wc l ~ a r c  gone to grc:it cslwnsc, sonietiniej 
ourscIrc3, soinrtiines by inducing t h e  Cdoninl nncl Iocnl nutlioritio to iindcrtato the 
work for us-wc linrc e r c c t d  fortificntioiisntn large outloj. butia  tlic rust majority 
of caccr wc lure  citlicr only gun. of nvcry sn1:111 c.ilibrc, or 110 gutis u t  rJ1 ; unrl in one 
cisc  I linvc rcpc:itdIy protested-I linrc exlinustctl injsclf in protcsting ag:iinst the 
iiup1ic.v-I slioitltl S : L ~  tlie ins:inity-of hiving sucli n vital poiiit 3 3  die Capo of 
GwJ IIopc for p t r s  n i d  jcws untlcfeiidrcl. \\‘licn our Couiuiission, ro wliiclt I 
hare nlrcad nllutlcd, wns npliointed in 165‘3, tlic first quedion tlint canic bcbrc 113 
was tlic c d n c o  of tlie ciipc. \ ~ c  went into tlic question, knowing its \-:lit iin- 
pr ta i icc  us iin iinpccinl stntion. we pos tpond cwry other question to press this 
onc question upon the  coilsitlcritioii of 1110 Oovrrriuent. \To did so prccs i L :  wo 
reportcd iiuuicdintcly nnd fullx on it, und I can truly ssy, I, mjsrlf, Iinre iicrcr lost 
nn opprtuirity, both in public nnd prirntc, of urgiiig it upon successire Qorcrn- 
iucnts ; and yct nt tliir luorucnt, tliouch the furls nrc built or builtlin,n. t1ic.r~ is 
1iroctimllj nonrmaincnt rlintcvcrin tlieui. I donot  say thcrt*is epccinl b!;ulic to rtny 
particular Gorcrnnicnt. The blanic must be w i d c s p n d  Tlic country is to blalne by 
its 3 inthy aid  iudi&xciicc to clnn::err wliicli, bcmurc thc arc not ininicdintc1y visible, 
nrr rtisrcgnrdcd ; but now that thc qiicstion 1133 conictcforc thc coiiiitry, I Iiu1,l i t  
to bc thc h i i i d c n  duty of ull tlioic who cin by voice or rote hriiig prwsurc to h,qr 
to UIC that  inllricncc to tlic ultrruiost for the couimon good. And IIOW u~ay T. in 
conclusion, S:LJ tliis, that wliilst aduiirin;: tlic ability with d i i c h  tlic p:ipr wliich 
the gallant ddni i rd  has wad to-d:ty hns becn h n n  up. 1 cnnnot subscribe to  i t  ? 
I think that  tkc gillant ddniiml Im3 attciuptcd to prore too mucli. I fully adillit 
with him that the Xavyir the Grst liuc. I wish to seo tint Snry strciigtlicnctl, ant1 
I triljt to  sco tknt this ncrr sc4ot i  of Purl imcnt  nil1 iiot p a 3  without n wry con- 
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home niid nbro:irl, nrc uot to bc phrd in n statc of dcfcnrc. tlicn I hcdd that the 
gullant L\diiiird iisLcd iis to go into, not n I:irgc, but an enormous, nu orcrsrlielniing 
cslicnditurc for n:ivi1 purposes. Tlrc ahwnw of dclcndctl ports ~ncans n Iinrnl ill. 
crcr. ;~ to wliicli it  swiiij to iiic diflicult to rct nny liiiiit. I tliiiili uc nr6 iii c1riig:rr 
at tile prezrnt iiioriirttt of wtiat I may  all n sce-s:itr of opiriion. IVc 11asc on tile 
one ritlc \crF able body of Inm who rvprcscnt to iis, ns I bcliere most trulj ,  t113t 
the Xury rcquircs a large incrraac--prab:ibly thcrc iiuy be a tcntlcncy to carry that 
ricw a little too fry, but on this I ilo not  now nrguc: on tlic ollicr 1i:ind, w.? Iiarc 
body of nblc incn \vho warn us of tlic ricks of inn-ion, nnd wlio nctiiall~ desirc to siir. 
rouiid this rast mctropolij with fortili:atiotic. Sir, :I) D mcrc ciri1i:iii who by Ioiir 
&roar this nftcrnoon niri nllorcd to atlclwsr I) ~irofcsrionnIniiiIiencc, 3 must Itoiicst]y 
6ny t h t  I bclicrc tlic triitli lics ronicsvlicrc in n nicm hctssrcii tlic two conllicting 
ricas. I bclicvo nlzo 
in rc;isoiiablc dcfeiicc which ought to be gitcii to oiir coaling stations nnd l~oiiic ports, 
iiiitl this without the loss of nn hoiir. I 110 und bcliere that  wo slid1 scc o rral 
niitl clTcctirc stcp iiindc this p r .  I Y c  d i d ~ b c  probnbly uskcd for a conritlcrablc 
a i m ,  but  i t  is not only tlic expntlititrc. of irioncj- that irill wciirc the object that wo 
1i;irc in ricw, but that such an cxpciiditurc ~kould  bo govcrncd br hrgc und n i s  
nnd ntatcsmnnlitu considcntions. 
Cupt:iin Srose, ILL : Sir Frctlrrict Stcplicnson andgciitlcincn, it is aitli consider- 
~ b l c  rcluctnncc that I obtrude lnrsclf upon your forbcnrancc upon this occasiou, but 
riiicc the g311mI iind distinguislird lecturer 1x1s lionoiircd ]no b j  pasing in rcricw 
a 1 :qc  portion of tlic p a p  sdiicli I ivus latclr pcriiiittrcl to read i n  this lnrtitution, 
t!icrc is no clioicc left to UIC in the uiattcr unk+ I wishd to nppcnr cliscourtcoiij to 
the lecturer Iiiiiisclf or inditlereiit to tlic issucs which haro brcn ra ird .  Tlic Icc- 
titrcr c : iy~  t1i:it lie clctccts “ tliwc incoinpntiblc lines bring pursued :” with the lirzt 
of tlicsc I Iinvc little s j u q ~ n t l i ~ ;  tlic third, allurlctl t o  ns tlic Imo stctclicd out by 
niyeclf, is not quitc n corrr‘ct intcrprctntion of my views. I do not adrocate “ tLc 
diqicr~:il of tlic Ariny all  ovcr tlic norld in ilct:irl~rd gnrris01)9,” but tlint mr:iI 
ba.-cs of oprr.itions nnd coding ztaiionj slioultl bc rcndcrcd ns far ns possiblciuiprrg- 
nablc ng;liiiit I) roup dc tnaiu on thc part of thc cncmF’s tlcet, and, morcoscr, I 
ngrccd uith Lord Clinrlcs Ilcn~ford’s rupgetion thnt coalii~g stations should bc 
prrironrd by ui:irinc3, iinlrsc thcrc was ioiiw rc:won for niniiitniniiig n wiliturj force 
in the lmdity ; now I rcutiirc to think that tliis lino of poolicj ir not uicrelr qiiito 
~oniptiblc nit11 n.11at tlic Iccturcr cullr Coloncl Jlnuricc’d linc, but t h t  i t  i3 nn 
insep:ir.iblc nud ejscutid portion of it. Wit11 rcgnrd to tlic rantention that “ tlicru 
i d  notliing bcrwcn a light Littcry and n lirst-cLis3 fortrtw,” I nm sonicsliat stir- 
p r i d  to lirar such nii ngiiuicnt atlrnncd in tlio prescnt clay, nnd rcntlrrc to tliiiik 
that  the “ n a r d  friciitl” to whom the Iccturcr allutlrs 1iiii.t liiirc wade tlic rciii:irk 
coinc few jcnrs ago in refcreiicc to the Inst Iiirtoryof fortification; if those wlio nrc 
rc~poirsiblu for our dcfccl&e works niid 3rmmncnts werc to relj  upon Iii&wicil 
prcccdciits to tlic saiiie cstciit that tlic lectiircr does, tlic point of tlic rruiork nlliidcd 
to  srould be more app;irciit. J l j  own contention t1iroug)iout iny lccturc w a s  that 
tlic accumc~ of iiiodcrn ortillcry lire iiiid tlic introdu .tion uf high csplosircs iii sliclls 
must bring iiito strong rclicf the \sizik p i n t s  of iron nntl uinwnr.v lrrninncnt worts 
and tLc nt l runtn~cs to be g:iincd by an rstcntlrll uco of mrtliworks, einrc tlic 1:ittcr 
are pr~ctically not inorc njIcc.trd by tltc rrplosion of n slicll containing ‘‘ Igdtlitc” 
than if it  wrrc liicrclj filled with giirij~os~dcr, w!icrciis the tcrrific cffcct of n high 
csplosire slicll apins t  iiusonrr or iron is now \rcll hnusrn, and I quotnl nn cxpcri- 
iiiciit nc Port Lobos. Sir LOtliiui Sicliolson furtlicr infornicd tLc nicctinr tliat tlie 
foregoing facts uerc b r n c  in mind in the mndruction of ull n c r  dcfcnsirc xrorks, 
untl t1i:rt a grc;it d c d  of v1iaL 1 11:itl s:iid on tlic slrljjrct Iiad nctunllj hcen nnticipatcd. 
Again, my nrlrocicy of light mnd timIiuui quick-firing guns in cartlien bnttcrics, 36 
opporcd to nny further iiicrc;ise in the 111 a v j  nni~ni~icrit  in protcctctl bnttcrics, (‘311 
ac:trtel~ bc ciitl to runge me with tlibse who .piti tlicir faith on cstmriigynt anna- 
iiiciits. I cantlot Lclp tbitikiiig t1i:tt tlic Icctiircr is stimiig tlic cnibcrs of n wnc 
co:itmrcrq to no iiscful pu rpw,  iiincniiicli ns tltc s>stciii of fortiGcation wIiic\i lie 
dcprwates has Lccii piiblicl? ~icki ios~lnlpcd bJ rcrpiisiblc Ollicvrs to bo n thing of 
the rapt. I do iiot think t l w  nrgimiwt 11131 “ns HC pnyoic n naval incrcrrc, wc 
sLould logicnllj yroyosc a fortilicitiou dccrcasc,” id quitc muad, nny worc than I 





























I i 3  
think tlint tho raising of n mountcd infnntrrrcgirncrit slioiild cntail tho cutting clown 
of a rrEinicnt of cnrn1r.r. and I trust tlic lcctiircr will forgirc iiic if I s:iv that  the 
impnrtiiil tlimissiori of n n j  qucstion of nnt iond tlcfciicc hctwccu Ofl&rs of tlic 
Army an11 S n r g i s  not likely to bc* forrviirdcil br iinprwin,o upon tlicnr nt tlic oiitict 
t h a t  tiicy n n ,  ‘‘ rirnls for tlic opcn p i h i  of tlie Ciiaiiccllor of tho Exclicqucr.” IIow 
can the Oorcrnmrnt or tlie countrr Iinrc n n j  confidence in tho rccoinnicndntion of 
naval nnd militnrj OEccri, if t l i g  nrc lcd 10 hclicrc that  cnch Scrricc looks upon 
tlic otlicr ns n r i d  iwtcnd of an nlly, nntl rcgnrds thc  qiicstion of notional tlcfciicc 
81 a tcrauiblc, in which a u l i  i3 to sce how inuch IIO can “ m r r ~  nmar from tlic till of 
t h c  CIianccIIor of tho Esclic ucr?’’ Tlic gnllnnt Adinira1 constaiitly iii:ikcs u$c of 
tlic rxprcs?iuir I‘tlia conwianl of tlic ten; nnd ndinits tlic ra~uc of tortitictl conling 
stations, hnrboiirj, kc., to tlic nary which 1 ~ 1 s  lost “ 1113 cominnnd of tlic rcn.” I 
would r u g p t  that  nor-n-cla.vs “ the  cornniancl of tlio fca”  is ratlicr n lawc ordcr, 
and tlint to  spcnk of 1OO,OOO,ooO squaw niilcs of narigablc aiitcrs, ctuildccl with 
possessionj of morc or lcsr raluc to  the Ihilidi Enipirc. ns tliougli t h y  roiild bo 
coiniirandrd with the s:iiiic fncilitj n y  nn iinportnnt t n d c  routc or n prcwribcd nrm 
of territoriiil wntcrs. i3 soiiicwlint liable to tnizlmd ; i t  ir quitc conwivnlilc tliat wc 
might tciiiitornily loic tlio conininud of ccrtniii waters d i i l e  wc rctaincd tlic com- 
mand of otlicrs, und ciirclc tlic Icrturcr will nllow nrc to bclicrc that  tlic dcfcnsildity 
of oiir dockynrrl3, Iinrboiir?, nnd coaling stations, in curli n case, would bc of the 
grcatcst rnlue in “rclicring” tho Nary. Rcferriiig now to tho skctcli of Singaporo 
d i ic l i  culrninntetl in tbc question-“So fnr n3 our war-slii s nrc conccrucd, d i q t  
differcucc clocr it makc whctlicr S i n r n p r c  Iins nltogctlier falfcn or wlictlicr onlr tho 
con1 atorc i3 ciii t j ? ”  . . . “t l ic  fortiflcntioii~ liaro nbroliitelj fnilcd to-hold 
aiir rclatioiij witri thc  moving nary. Thcy Iiarc not gunnlcd it3 storca, and they 
cnniiot in nny 1va1 nesi?t i t  to recorer tlic coiiiiiinntl of the sci.” Tiit? lecturer 
forget, t h t  one of oiir cqii:idronr is si i  qwo“i1 to lime t lnwn it3 suppl j  of eon1 
alrcutlJ, nnc1 tlint it Singapore Hero not Iortiiccl, crcii t1ii3 onc siipply coiilil 1inr.e 
been captured by n single fiist criiizrr bcforc our sqii:itlroii nppi rc t l  oii the rccne; 
niorcorer, tlicrc is no rcaaon w l i j  the  coal store sliould br foiincl ciiiiitp on tlic rctiirn 
of our rqundron, U I I I C S ~  n w r y  insiiflicicnt siipplj li:id lnrn storccl tlicrc in pace-  
tiinr, or unlcss, owing to tlic incnpncitr of the ~il:icc to tlcfciid i t d f ,  i t  l i ~ t l  f : i h  nn 
e q r  prcj to  tlic cnemj’r cruizcrs. lhxicles, our war-ship tire not tlic o n l j  thing3 
t o  be considered, iiiicl i t  woiiltl ninkc n rcry considcr.iblc clilTcnmcc to our Incrclimit 
flcct, nnd to tliosc at  liumc who wcrc clcpcnding on tlic siipplies cnrricd by tlint flcct, 
if it wcrc possible fur nn cricinf3 cruizcrs to sink or c:iptiirc tlir tlii q)iiig in tlio 
l inrbi i r  witliout n zindc j i i o  kin: fired in self-dcfcncc from eliorc Iattcrics. I 
h o p  tlic lcctiircr will pi on xne if I siiy tlint he has unintcntion:illy misrclirescntd 
nic with rcrnrd tn tlio h . 3 ~ ~  olore m k i n g  nttncks on ni i  cnernc’s ctron,nliolds : I 
cli~tinclle s;id tlint ~.iclr Scrriccrcqriirctl tlic co-olrcration of tho otlicr, both in iittnck 
and dcfcnce; Itiorcorcr, if tbcrc is nn 0lli.w of the R g o l  Marinrs prcicnt, lic t n i j  
bc nblc to  inform u3 that  tho nnrnl niitlioritirs coulcl. indcd ,  undcrtakc attncks 
aitliin errtiin limits, without nn nit1 from tho n~ilitnry oiitlioritirj ; tlicm is, tlirre- 
fnrc, no occasion for .idiiiirnl Cofonib to innkc nny corrrction on tliis acorc, n j  1 :in1 
in pcrfcct accord with Iiiin. With rcfcwncc to the second corrcction, I uni nbsalutcly 
nt Issue xvitli him, inasiiiucli 03 I think tlic liistoricil prccedciits of 303 y n r r  apo 
arc of no inore rnliic to tho S a r j  than t l ic j  nre to  the Amij froin o rcitn/iJc p i u t  
of Tics ; conditions linvo changed since tliosc d a p ,  and wc must pcrforcc nrcoiiiiiio- 
date our ioilitnry and nard pol iq  to  tliosc r l ia i ig~~l  conditions ; nnml s t n t e g r  is 
now dcpcntlcnt upon con1 siipply nnd tlic rmootli working of coniplicatecl niacliincrj ; 
tho first object of on cntcrprising enemy will, tlicrcforc, bo to wire niir con1 siipplica 
atid tnkc p s j c s i o n  of siirli plnco a9 arc ntlapteil by rcnion of hwbours nntl doct- 
p d s  for r c p i r s  ni!d rcfittiiig of macliiiicry. 8 c . :  tlic po.;.;cssion of siirli points 
emnot  fiiil to cxcrcisc n clcciwe intluencc iiyoii nll future nnrnl worfnrc, nntl iro 
liire nb>oliitdj no  prcmlcnt of two or inorc fird-clnss maritiine l’owcr~ bring 
cngngcd in nnral olicrationr undcr n~odcrn condition3 upon a s c ~ l o  wliicli woiilrl in 
tho sm:illctt dcgrcc forcsliadow the coiirsc of crcnts in the futurc. Tlic Iiictorirnl 
nietlicrl of nrguiiwnt is reductire, hilt it  is f i i l l  of pitfall., and the time i:, now r i p  
in naval ninttcrs to  crcrlc prcccrlciits instaid of following tliciii, n l w n p  escqitiiig 






























wc arc bcntcii. Tlic lccturcr 1ajs mccli ~trcs3  on tlic diflicriltr of sopplying n 
bcsicgctl i invnl  fortress with food nntl niunitiors of war, but Iic ignorcs tlic fact t11at 
tlic blockntling flcct not oi11.r rcqiiircs 3 larger zupldy of the saiuc ncccrsarirs, but 
a150 3 coiirtniit ciipply of con1 to cunble i t  to Lcep tlic ern. \\‘hat wo I I ~ T C  to  fe i r  i, 
not 3 proloiigcd i i i r o l  sie;c, but  3 suddcir attack u t  n n j  gireii p i n t  b j  an ciiciiiy 
\vlio is iii t c i i i p r q  couiiiinnd of ccrtaiii wntcrj; I cniinot brliere tliat n ian j  iin\al 
Olliwrs trill bc found to cndorso tlic Icctnrcr’s opiiiion that. as oiir Xnrj is incrcnsrcl, 
EO rlioiild our furlijird conliiig station3 nnd dwky:irtlj he dccrcnsrd, and that tlic 
forniation duri iy  actirc o p p t i o n s  of ‘ I  unrforfijtd tlcldts of eiipplj and undefcndcd 
n a r d  b:iscs n3 c!osc as possihhlc to tlic s c n e  of action ” a n  crcr bc 3 reasondilc or 
rfliciciit siib:titutc for fortifictl conliiig st;stioiis, Iinrbours, nntl tlockjnrtls all over 
the rrorld. CJ~~JIC of rclf-defence, niitl nhlc to nflortl nssistanco to tlic Sary in tiiiic 
of iiccd, whctlicr i t  bc for rcpnir3 to nincliincr~, to ninkc good tlaningcs sustninctl iri 
nctim, or  to rcncrr the co:il supplj. I iiiiist nldogizc to IOU, Sir, and to tlio 
mcctiivv for occiipjing so niucli miunblc time, ontl cnirc pinlon from dtliiiiral 
~olomg’if in  uij somewlint liiiiiible military pzitioii I liarc bccn iiidimcct in t:i~iiig 
too wrin nn iiitcrcei in the n i i r s  o l  thc Jieter Scrvicc. 
Captain 1’. FITZGEH.WI: It i3 inipossible in the dior t  tiiiic n t  our d i s p w l  to 
criticize atlcquntc4j this rcry nblc paper. Acliiiicil Colomb told 11s tlint lie wn3 
going to take tlio positioii of n spccid p1e:itIcr in tt.c cnse, :ind in n lcttcr wliicli lie 
ctl to tho “‘~itiic~,” a sliort time ugo, lie s l i d  hc was going to  tiikc tlic position 
of tlie “tlcril’a ndrocntc.” I ratlicr t l i i i i l i  lie Ins doiic €0. I r i p c t  tlint he slioiilrl 
1i;ivo takcii that  Iio.ition, nnd t1i:it Iic should-if I Iiiny my so uitliout nriy oikncc 
-1iavc cxog!gcmtctl or ovcrnitctl 1ii.r tnsc, bcc:iwc i t  is n casc t1i:it docs not rcquirc 
nwrd:iCng ; the f:icts nn. so clciir niitl p1p:ibIe tbnt D ciiiiplc statcmcnt of tlio 
rchtive in.1wrtnncc of ii:irn? and x i l i tn r j  clcfcncc for this Einpirc is sutlicicutlj 
obvious, if sct forth 1il:iinlF \ritliout i~ttciiipting to bring i t  to the p i n t  of rrdrclio 
ad ~ ~ S U ~ ~ I I I J ~ ,  ns Sir Lotlii:in Xiclioison hag said ; no doubt Adininl Colonib’s 
dcsirc is to rGsc a friendly dixiission between Otiiccn of tlic Ariiir a i d  Xnvy n, to 
tllc rcslicctirc riicrits of tlicir niodcs of drfcncc, and i t  is oiilr to bo s i i p p m J  t h t  
cncli side sliould t:ikc tlic liiic of “nothing like Icathcr.” But i t  weiiis to iiic t!int 
the case i 9  so abiolutelj clcar that  the dcfcnce of tho Empire is so nbdii te ly  
dependent UIMII tlic S n r j  tlirt tlic 0 t h  side aro “not  in it,” to IISC n spor!iiig 
exprr.&iioii. 1 do not d.rh lo $3~- nnjtliing in tlie lcnst oflensire to lhc .wltlicr3, but 
11iey nn‘ “ n o t  in the h u n t ”  a t  d l  in tlrc ninttrr. I niii quit0 sure t l q  \voiild not 
acccpt tlic rile of stnilding still to lirc giriis from beliind tin impi ic tnble  fortress. 
Tlicj- will 1i:ttc their rdfe in the &fence of the Enipirc iii defending India, wlicro 
t l i q  will L i v e  tlicir work cut out, but tlic! hare notliiiig to do with the dcfcncc of 
this United Kingdom, b r w i w ,  oiicc it coiiirs.to ligliting on tbrsc E ~ I O ~ C S ,  if oiico 3 
roliirtccr fircs n shot in nngcr, nll  I wn sn! ir, it will Lc “ n l l  up.” he niizlit ns 1 ~ 1 1  
firc blnnk, ercry hit. ( “ \ \ ‘ I i j ? ” )  Uccniisc you will bc stiirred. (L‘ Esplnin.”) I 
will eqilain in onc iiiini:tc. I Iinvc snit1 I tliouglit Adiiiirnl Colonib orcrst:itcd Iris 
msc. nnd 1 aiii bound to girc JOU ionic inr~unccr. I think wlicn Iic p i r t c d  out  tho 
e:ise of l’lviiioiitli, \rlicre the s l i ipwcrc siippscd to be Icd nwny.or to go nnd nttnck 
lSri+t, and were to br cut off from tlicir bnsc b j  tlic cnciiir, be said i t  woiiltl bc all 
the cninc to tlic Aduiinl \rlictlicr Pl.vlnoiitll w s  tntcii altogctlicr or wlictlicr tlic 
coiiiiiiunicatioiis wcrc cut. It would be all thc sanio for that  A1iiiir:il niid for tlint 
1):irticiihr critc iricc, but it would not be nll the wine to tlic coiintry. I t  \vo!ild 
stop tlic pnrtickrciitcrprisc in 113iid, but tlicrc would hc n vast diffcrcncc iii tlic 
gci;cml clTcc t oii tlic couutrj. And tlicn rrlicii he goc3 on to Iioiiit out t1i:it fortified 
111:1ccs linvc nlwars fnllcn wlicn tlic hare brcii stcndilj nttncked from tlic s c ~ ,  hc 
torgcts t tIcrz at; . i i i a i i ~  pl;itcs d i i c i  liare ncrcr bvcn nitwkctl bwaiizc t l i r ~  wcrc 
siippo+cd to be iniprcpnblc. If i t  was u rule thatn fort ifitrl pl:iccsliotiltl be ntt:ickcd 
froin tlic ccn and tnkrn, \~l iy  was not Cronstndt taken, or d i y  did thc nav:il nttnck 
f:iil nt S t * b n e t c p l ?  Ecbnstcqxd m 9  t:iLen nftcrtrnrtlr, i t  i3 true. but it \\as froiii tlic 
land. Also a i t l i  r r p d  to Sing:iporc, I tliiiik IIC orcrst:itctl his wsc, and Cn1it:iin 
stoiic II:H toucliccl upcn that  vcrr ably. d d n i r n l  Coloiiib twiinies that  onc srvoop 
. i s  to tnkc nway nll the cod and ICJW aii einptjctorc for the iwst  comer. Eiiiyapqrc 
unlurlilletl \\auld hc a ruppl j  to the cnriiij;  for t i l id  i t  would bc ablc to rriist 
atttrch of light tliips, nt n i i j  ratc, and to rcplcni2li our own s h i p  wkcn they CPLUC 
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tlierc. I 
tliink Lord Cnrnnrran rntlicr niimti tlie p’int \r.~irn 110 tnlkcd ribut n flcct rrfitting 
nndcr tlir guns of Siiiplmrc. ‘lliat nsziiiiics tlint they nrc clrfcntcd. 1 niii qiiitc 
with Admihl Cclonib tlirrc. ‘llirr cnn wlit in an oprn 1i:irboiir cinlcss clcfcntcd, 
but if they arc tlcfcatcd t l i q  gct undcr tlic gins. but that incnns that tlic! llnvc 
Inst tlic locd conimnntl of tlic rcn. anti t l int all eotniiiuiiicitions woiilil bc cut off. I 
think t l i n t  tlicsz tcclinicnl tlitcuasions 0111~ h i 1  up to tlic ii1:iiu point, \\MI srciiiy 
t o  nir to bc tliis. that tlir niniii nrtcrirz of trade nntl comiiicrcc for tlii. country 
nrc a11 orcr tlic world. ‘l’licsc artcricj eoiitaiii tlic life’s bloocl wliicli is c~rciitinl 10 
tlic csistcnco of tlic Empire. 1 won’t eoiifinc III rrlf to f m l .  It is not n yucitiot1 
of f o d  onlp, i t  is also 3 qur+tioii of raw iii:itcri:ir. Tlierc is no w e  in your q i n g ,  
a9 lfr. \Vil~on said in R qirccli the otlicr day, *‘I 4 1  corirey fowl iuto tliccountrj; 
it is iniporsiblo that they CJII blockndc iiL“ Triic; but :it whi t  price, nnd who is 
going to pny ftlr i t ?  ,\rc 
nc not nmrc  tlint tlirrc arc 37 inillions of p~oplc  in tlirrc irlnnds, niid 3 hrgc 
proportion of tlicsc, tlioii$i l int  now nt ztnrvatioii p i i i t ,  ccrtniiily \could bc if )OII 
doublccl the Iiricc of brcict. Tlrcwforr. joii nrc bouiid to bc hroiiglit to Four knccs 
n t  onrc if pour coiiiiiiiiilic;itioilJ niid yoiir raw iiintcri:il nrc cut off. I t  is 110 iizc 
bringing in  food if tlic ~ ~ c o p l c  eniiiiof. bur i t ,  nritl you nrc, tlicrcforc, nbsoliiirly 
dclivnilcnt u~101 i  r n i v  rnatcri:il for iiinniifiictiirc. Tlicrcforc, tlir wliolc quvstion 
I i i i i p  ittclf oii there nrti*rirs of coiiiiiicrcc. I f  pou cut  n tiinri’s nrtcrics it is n nwrc 
v:ork of sul~t~rcro~:ition to 6noA liir brains out, Lcc:iiisc ~ o i i  \~orild liarc alrtwty 
killcit Lini, nncl t l i n t  is 1111 you wint to do. 1 cl;iri*sny you 1111 rcniciiilcr tlic con- 
cliitliiig uortls of tlint rcr? nblc cligrst by tlic Coiiiniiltcc on tlic Xnrd  Jlnnmivrcz, 
\vliew, nftw suiiiiiiing up tlic ivliole as,., it is said, “ lly licr Xnry she niurt stniict 
or fn11.” In concluiion, I \rould vciitirrc to rend sou n short quotation froni tltc 
“Tiiiic+“ in R lcdiiig nrticlc of tlic Erd of Jnuunry. The “Tiuics” iiinkcj 
tliis st:itcincnt, niid I slioulcl lilic to Iicnr this controrcrtcd if pozsihlc: “If 
tlic Snvy is made tlion~uglily coinpctcwt for its work, no otllcr dcfciicc for 
tlicsc islniids or for tlic Ihipirc nt Inrgc will crcr bc cnllcil into play. I f  tlic 
Xury f:ds II?. iio otlicr tlcfciicc will iirail to nrcrt crushing diwiter.” Tlicrc ic 
a plnici st:itcniciit, uiid if tLnt raii be controrcrtcd by our friciitl, the roltliew, Ict it 
bz donc. 
Coloiirl JIACBICI:, R.A.  : Tlic rcrr  kind rcfcrcncc irliicli Adniird Coloinb li:13 ninilc 
to nic i n  tlic w r l j  part of his lxipcr cliallcngrs inc torn cractlr Iiow Inr I tliink IYC 
ouglit to cspciitl our ;irin;r in tbrw fortresses ant1 ccxiiig stniioirs so iis to lore tlic 
form which v c  n+it clrcwlicrc cinplo~. Xow, Grst of all, I y:rrticiil:irl,v tlinirl; 
Adiiiird Colonib for hariug tlm\m nttcntion to that aqwct of the d j c c t ,  tlint is to 
~a:, tlic use of our Armr in co-opcmtion with the XUTJ for certniii Europriin 
lriirlnscs, bccmsc it srcint& to nic n little rtmnge to l i a r  n stntc~iirnn to wlioin v-o 
owe so much in tlierc nrattcrs as 1m-d Cnrnarvnn siini up tlic fin:rt subjcct of our 
drfcncc brsnjing that it ronsi4cd in  the protcctionof our shore$ nndoirr co~iinicr& 
I think t h e  is nn oiiiittccl tliinl claiisc tlicrc of great iinportnnw, and t1i:it is the 
lirotcctioli of oiir grcnt Knstrrn Empire and oiir Co1oiii:il posrcsions. Xow iiiy 
piirpsc, if nip frirnd Cnptniii Fitzger.iltl \ \ i l l  nlloa ~ n c  to Lc “ i n  it at ull,”cpcnkii g 
purclr ns n roltlicr, aitliout attciiiptiiig to intrude into nny question of nninl 
stratcg. or tnctica, lins brcn, i n  the .-tattwciits to wliicL Adiriiriil Colonib nl lut l~t l ,  
to  givc n l in t  is lint i n )  opiiiton only, but u1i:it is tlic :ib-ohitc jiitlgiiicnt of the 
statedinen of tho Conti:icnt to 1iycvrtnin hno\~lcd~c ,  tlint tlic Xnvyraii, by rcntlcriiig 
such nsiztnnrc n d  is in its p n c r  to the nmics of pr t ib le  nllics,nrid by tnnsportiiig 
nn nririr aiid enabling it to >trike nt ccrtnin pl:iccs, not ilircctlj-, but indirect11 carrr 
out tlint third p r L  of the yrogrnmnic, :inti cnsiirc tlic snfct1 of India nix1 tlic 
Colonicj. I t  srciii~ to nic t1i:it i t  is ritnl to 11s that that third poiut, the raluc of 
the Xnry nnd of our t~iriqrortiiig 1ioncr for tlic clcfcncc of 1ndi:i nntl tlic Co1t.iiic.s. 
slioiild IJC rcrogiiizcul. I, nt Imrt. iii:iy clnitn riot to linrc tn*cn c:illing out t h t  t l i rn .  
i j  notliiiig like Iratlicr, 1 ) c ~ i i r w  in cvcrytliirg tlint I liarc bccn raFing on tlirse 
subjects I Ii;tvc bcrii crpinq out for tlic atrcn:tlicnirig of tlic S a r j  ; and 1 Ii:irc p i c  
furllier t l int i  tlint, brcnitrc, nltliuiiglr I nni well n w r c  tlint wlint is most nccrss:iry 
in orrlcr to briii: oiir voluntrcrs nticl our lionic nriiiy iiito tlrc conditioii of i i i i  
cffcctirc nriuy i n  tLc Ucld is uu iiicrc;isc of uy own nrw, tlic ficld nrtillery, 1 Iinvc 
That is all, I think, I Iinvc to snv in opporition to Aclniinil Colonih. 
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still mnintainctl tlint that iricrcioc should not be nintlc riiitil tlio Xnrj 113s first 11311 
it3 Iiropcr share of u t t c d o n ;  I niny ~ 3 p  i t  waq from dcliiiieil Colonib. nntI froiii 
brotlicr iii airlicr jcirs. nnd from my fricncl tlic .late Colonrl IIonic. wlio n l w n ~ ~  
sliorrnl tlic iiiost cngcr nnriety in suppr t ing  the S : r v j  in nll t h o  innttrrs, tlint T 
was first. Iirought to p o ~  nttcntion to tliero p e n t  qiwtions of tlrc conling stntions 
and oitr IincA of cornmiwe. As i t  happciis, I n.ng tlic Eccrctiirj of thc Coininittcc 
wliozr t1iit.r i t  csliccinlly was to dctcrniiiic tlic garrisoiij ttliicli slioiiltl IIC n-zigtlctl to 
t1io.e co:ilin,o stations, nnd 1 c:in a w r e  Atlniiml Coloinb Iirct 1.' tldinitrlr, rvitlioiit 
toiicliin~ ripon unj  mnttcrs of contiilential information. t1ir.t tlio p I i c r  that  11n9 
bcrn ntloptcvl throughout in relation to tlirni i3 prccirrly d i n t  both lie nnd I wizh, 
t h t  i,. to  miniiiiiro tlic prr isonr  we clctncli froni our nctirc nr inj  to tlic rrrj  lowest 
possiblr p i n t .  trusting as far n3 possible to tho pntriotizni of tlic Colonics for loml 
na&tnncc on the spot-to iiiiniriiirc it nlniwt cntirclg to riich n supply ns n i n j  bc 
nert.s.;nrc of enpcrt pinncrg, a110 slinll train nnd tlcrclop tlir giiniicr~ Iiriicticc of the  
rnrii on t h c  srot, ond thnt for tlic single purpo'e of thing the pre&c tliirig wIiic11, 
ns I linrc uritlcrdood, both brothers have insietrtl upon, n:riiicly. proridirrg SIIC~I 
protwtion to  oiir coal that me ~11311 not bc ~ ~ l i o w l  to the dsngrr of n sit& cruircr 
running into n conling ctation, filling 1*rr biidicrs, burning the rest of the cod. niitl 
petting clear nrvny. That  i 3  tlic cliliiciilty tliat. must n l n y  present itrclf to the 
Knvr. iinlczs tlicre bc 3 c l i n ~ p  of policy n t  tlic Aclminltr. Ercrjbwlr who liar 
11nt1ilie ~ r a s t  o cIo with Adniinltyclccisioiis in tIic ninttcr iviII brw nic out t ~ i a t ,  not 
once, but u,o:iizi nntl again, tlic Adiiiinlty h r c  t1rrlnrt.d tlint t h y  will in no n.ny 
wliatzocrcr bc rcsponiiblo for the dcfcnrc of ports or conlinq stntions, nnd  tlicy iiiri,t 
upon i t  that  the Xnry sliall be kcpt clrar for the work of dczlrojing tlic encnir's 
flrrtr on tlie oprn sm, niid that the m:iling stntions nntl ports nrc nbsolutel~ ouiof 
their clinqr. If tlic Xnr.riiitcnds to tnkc cliarreof tlirrr p r t s o n i l  conlin,n dtationz, 
and mcnns to bc rcspoiisiblc for thcir gunrdiansliip, lct it  hc iindcrstood tlint t1ie.r 
do so, but  do not Irt i t  go forth as thc Atlminlty a n y  ot prrscnt: " \ r e  r i l l  not 
F C I I ~  n ship to pi of nny kind to rlcfriitl Si~igtporc \tliicli wc giinnntcr shall rcrna:n 
tlirrc. 14 c will rrnd yoii R gunsliip if it  Iinppcns to suit our conrenimcc. biit, v c  
will not bc rc*ponsiblc for tlctniiiing it tlirrc so nq to defrntl Singapore." l'lint 
qiicstion slioiild bc ~cttlcil. I do not think niysrlf i t  ijnqiicstioii in whir11 tlic Ariny 
a 1 1  have any other than nnc iIittrc*St. IJnd thnt i3 to Iimc ns rninll a. posi111t* n pore 
tion of the Arm: tolcloff for tlic tlrfriirc of tli~rccli;-t:iiit conling station?, bceni:*o tlic 
Army cannot bo Fpared for tlicir clcfcncc without clrtr.icting.frnin its nrai1:iblc 
p a e r  rl?ewlrcrc. I V c  iionc 
of 11s want to  Lc tlicrc. n u t  do not Irk tlicrc bc ni i~mis i i i i t lrrztant l in~  nboiit i t ,  nntl 
(10 not let 11s br told tlint ou nrc rcl.ritig irpori 11s for tiic dcfcncc of tlic-c stntioriz, 
wllcrl in fuct ?oil nrc not (Toirig so. ~ i c r c  is onr otlirr p i n t  wliic~i tirir bccn niizd 
rrvcnd tinica in n 7encnl fonn, riz., tlir prcscnt iinccrtniiitirs of nnrnl trtttli.-nction, 
that  I wnnt to illiistrJtc, bp o m  sprif ic  qiicstion: I do not know how far the 
clnborntc expcriincnts wliicli Frnncc 1i:is bccn of late mnkinz wit11 high cxplo$ires 
nrc liiionn to nny Ollicers in this room, but  t l i q  Iintc lccii rnrricd oiit with tlic 
prcntcst. rnrc, the ii-ost clabor.itr skill, iizid nt iiii~iriiitrd cost ; nor is it II rcrrct that  
Frniicc hng to nbroliitcly conrinccd kcrrclf of thc p o w r  of high cxplo:ircj, both 
npin.zt Ship3 nnd in the firlrl, tlint slic is ctoriri: tlicin ne rnpidlg as slic can, niid 
eprnding Inrgc siiiris in tho elaborJtc stoniqcof frcsli crp1osirc:',co1itinri:illy cmploytl 
in tllo retilling of sliclls that  liarc dctrrior:itnl, so t1i:it slrc ulwarr 113s frcsli nintcrial 
rcatlj for instant uic. I 3111 told n t  tlic prcscrit nionicnt the SnrF do not like 
tourliing thcsc high crplosirw. I can wdl  uiidcrrtnnd i t ;  tlicrc arc not iiinnr of 
us tlint do, nnd onc clillicultr iindonbtcdl~ n h i i t  all tlirsc iiinttcrs is that EIICIJS Iillcd 
with Iii;.h cxplo5ircd do not kccp, nritl t1i:it )on ncrcr know wlicn 011 nrc going to 
riin come risk wit11 tllcni if tliry 1i:ivc not bccri rccrritIy fi11rc1, or t L t  t l i r j  urc not 
~ e r y  sriitablc for s l i p  like our:', coliimiszioncd for tlircc I w r s  u t  n tiiiic. 1VIi:tt I 
wnnt to n<k Arlurinl Colonib i3 this : is i t  1101 possililt. n t  lcnrt that for the rcr: rltort 
I I I O ~ C  nrroz'3 thc ( l*nnncl, high-cr~ilosivc rlicllr. plnrnl fresh oii board ant1 possessing 
tlic ap nllitng dcitructire power wliirli is nttribritrtl to tlicni bp tlio+c who Iinrc 
carcfu&. trictl t~icvn, may prom i i n p ~ m a i i t ~ j  clliu.tivc ng:iiiist 3 ncrt of ours wliicli, 
bccsiisc of its diiticd rcqiiiring it to  l i o v c  on bo:inl lor c l ir tni i t  r o j n p  csplosirr~ 
s l t ich will kccp, lias not rcnturtd to u a k c  uzc of tlicu 2 Is i t  not nt least possible 
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tha t  thc littlo blue s t m k o f  water might le elcrrcd br them for t\vcnty-fourhours? 
If that  is so, I want to  know, do TOU rrally accept that  stktcinent in the “ ~ i m e ~ * l  
nrtirlc. tlint if only tlio danger uiid tlic poadibilitj of invnsiou is upon u j  we nro going 
to  brnd tlic knees nt once. It is not in this  enbe a tlurstioir of our being stnrruJ, or 
anything of tho kind. T h t  may Iiappen without our bcing starred, nnd without 
our hnring had our  mrnmercc wriously injurecl nt nll. I, for onc, say therti nro 
uiorc than 30 mi!lioiis of 113 in tlieec islands, and I [lo not think m-e mcan to  subniit, 
nrid I do not bclicro tho “Times” rcprcients tho feeling’of tlic Engliili nntioii that 
they ore going t o  submit bceiurc tlio iiiere danger of inr:irion ha3 eoiiic upon US. 
Wo must be readj  on slioro ns ~ c l l  ns b j  eeh if wo arc not to run thid risk. 
Adminl  Sir 1;. FASSIUKB : 1 wish to make one or two obwrrationj upon wlint 
General ICrsEino line said, bm:wcc 1 tliought hi, rcniarlis wore not antagonistic to  
tlic pnpcr th3t A d m i d  Coloiiib hn* rcad. 110 sltowed that  if we wcrc to (10 nwny 
with all our land fortification9 wc rlioultl do w o n g ;  but I do not tiiiderstnnd 
Atlrnird Colmib to Iiarc mid RO slioultl do SO in  Iiir papar. I undtrstoocl him to 
r:\y tltnt, ns lins been donc in former limes, wo ought to  11.1~0 nirnns of clcfeiico in 
cnw of raids, or thnt  nny portion of on rncniy’s inrndiiif nriny rllcctctl n Innding 
ili tliia country. I think tlic two tliiiigs arc rrrj mucli in uccordnnco with tach 
other. After General Erskiiic tho mecting otldrc~sctl b r  Sir Lotliiqn SiclioI6on. 
I think when h o  €aid tliut tlicro waa but little in forincr nnvnl espcrirncr to p i d o  
11s for tho future, bo exprcsscd on opinion nbjoliitcly contmry to that of t h o  K R T j .  
The coding stntions 1iarc becn ripken of n great denl, n i d  tlioii;l~, I niiirt my, I 
tliinti Adniinl Colomb’s gcnernl principlc6 n i  to tho maiiiicr in wliicli tkis ooulitry 
oilglit to wngo nnrnl wnr nro round, yet I do not tliiiik they nrc npplicablo to tllo 
circunirtnnco of conling stations nnd forcigii fortroses surli ns Zlnlta. H’o lisrc 
llnd tho ndrnntngo of hearing Coloi~cl Mnurice, wlio explained r l in t  thu enso wnllv 
is wit11 rcg:ird to t l m c  ; and I cntircl concur in what ~ 3 3  snid by CoIonrI JInuric‘c 
on tlic eitbicct. Ai1iiiira1 ~ o ~ o l n b  ,frd its, in orc1c-r to astaLlij1i thc principler on 
whicli wo ~ l i o i i l d  wngo nard war, to look t o  1 w t  history. Evcryonu knows that 
tho principles of wnr nro not things t l i n t  rr:idilj eliaiifio; tlioy lic d r ~ p ,  and aro not 
~ar iablc .  Thc instruments nnd inctliods with aliicli war ir wngcd w r j ,  of course. 
8 3  scicnco progrcssrj ; hut  thc principles rctnnin the sninc. Aditiinl Colomb nskcll 
113 to look into 1110 Iii31orj of tlio Nary with I) view to nsccrtaining wlint  our position 
is with regard to  the etrength rc UiFL‘d for thc Sury. I do uot think i t  can ba 
dcnid, for n moment, by nnjono l~lio docs SO, tlint this country dcl~cndc nltogeflicr 
t o  maintaiii the  position i t  has ns one of thc g m t e r t  of tlic fircat Powen of tiio 
world, upon its 1i:iririw the command of thc  sra. If tlierc wcrc nny question of our 
losiiig tlint comm:in8 of tlio scn, we ought iuimccliatcly to  iiinkc tlio xnry strrng 
eiioiigli to prevent i t :  the lose of i t  is not a thing to bo nllosvcd i i t  ir tlint on which 
the  existenro of this countr j  depeiidr-nr n 6cCc”t l’omer. ddmiml Colomb went 
through the  history of tho country, nnd mfcrrcd to many c a m  to cnforas this. 
Taking thc crucinl iiislances rlien the war opcmtiou. in contcmpktion was tho 
invasion of this country, lie nientiourd four within thc lnct 150 years. Thc tso 
most importnot wcrc tlioro in tho SerenYcars‘ Wnr in 1553, nnd tlic grmt endcarour 
of hh oleon. They show tlint the  military opiniou of tlioso r h o  undertook them 
wns, t i a t  the only w a j  to do it wu to prevent us from hnring tho conimand of tho 
Wn. I sllould not cnro to refer to  the first one nt  n n j  length, bcmusc the  second is 
much morc important; but  from tlin Grot one 1rc m a j  1c:irn what this coontry cnn 
do when it is ruled by n JIinister who understand, and tliorouglilj g ~ i s p ~  tho fact 
th3t it is his busin-, and a rent proof of his statesmanship, to  wield and to 
apportion tllc various portions of tho wnr rcaourccs of the  natiou. ~ h e j  will ceo 
d i n t  we can do wlien tlint is the ease, instead of i ts  k i n g  left to  tho two Dcpnrt- 
nirnts to  rettlc bctscen tliemsclres. I now refer to tho last great ntteiiipt a t  
inrmion under Napoleon, chiming as hie opinion, being that  of one of tho p n t e s t  
tnnstcrs of wnr the  world haa ewr produced, that  thin c o u u t v  m w  not to  bo inraded 
iiatil lic liaZ acquired from us tho commnnd of the  m s  where his iiirasion was to 
bo carried on. IIc bad an cnthusiastic nrmj which h o  had trained for year3 for 
tho purposo ; b u t  lic could not get the command of tho K)U awuy from us, nnd he 
tlrcrcfors failed. I think anyonc Rho r i l l  considcr tlint instmoo will Gild sunicicnt 
r w n  for najing that it ir abwlutclj n e c w a r j  that re .Lould allow no quertion 
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Whatcrer about our hnving the commnnd of tlie sea, ns far ns nuch n thina 'is 
possible to & made niathcmatically certnin. Sir Lothian Xieholson thinks th i t  it  
to bo re rcltcd that such n p p e r  ns d d m i r d  Colomb's hnd been'rcnd, becaurc 
tho  Ilress d f  publish it ; and t c public will only hear onc side of the question, 
bcenrl~o tho pnpcr will bo gircn in  full, nnd tho discns&n will bo condenrcd. UiLt 
tllc Tcry raison .d'&re of Admiral Colm~b's pnpcr, from its first parqmpli ,  is that 
ocrtoin rtntemcnts lind been made in n former pnpcr. xvritten b r  an Ofiiwr on 
&tail of olic brnncli of military tcicncc. riz., nrmiiig batteries wit11 quick-firins 
guns. A great part of that  F n p r  Went into tho fundnmentnl rilles upon d i c l i  tho 
whole nrmcd force of this country nrc to bc eniplojed in nnr. I myself, nlien'1 
liean1 tlic nrguments, thought tlicm bcjond nieasuro unround, nnd to indinto that  
tlint Oliicer was not T C ~ J  well ncqiinintcd with tlio history of tlio wars which tlrir 
country liiu bccn c n p d  in diiring tlic last ttro ccnturies; nnd I wry much 
repet ted tlint it shoul8 go fort11 froni this liistitution without somc rcplr ;  but  1 
felt that wc werc then discussing quick-firing p ins  in baltcricj. But  tlic opinions 
cxprcssed in tlint paper harc gono forth to  tho country, nnd 1 think i t  wns quite 
riglit tlint t h q  should tlierefore be discussed lien?. Xow, with regnnl to the rnlue 
of thc past history of the S a r r  as  a puidc to the future, wc should recollect that, 
included in  n a r d  history, the Anny has got n r c r j  glorioiis history. I should like 
to trice thnt  glorious histor7 of tllo Army tlirongli its nnnnls. I would go back 
fnr ns thc  wnr of the Spanish nuccrssion, which rentlercd immortal tho namc of 
JInrlbrough. Thorn mns nn Eiigluli nrniy on foreign soil. Ilotr \ m i  that  army 
supplied? That  nrmy wns supplicd bxnuso TC Iind obtniiied tho command of tllc 
$en at  tlic Bnttle of k, LIogue. Q O  on to  tliencxt grcatwnr-thcScrcn Tears' V'ar. 
TLc brillhnt crploit of General Wolfr, xrliicli c n d d  in tlic mpturc of Quebec. was 
rendcrcd pr r ib lc  bkour  haring tlic couimand of tlic E ~ S ,  to maintain irliicli l a t p  
n e t s  bloclindcd Bmt and Toulon. Tlic Batrlo of Plassy r a s  won by Clirc; bllt 
tbis would n c r ~ r  hnre been fought if Admiral Wntaon hnd not bccn thcro with Iiic 
flect to protcct and co-opcmto with the army. In tlic next rrnr tlic peat opcrntion 
of the Army m s  tho defcnce of Oibmltar, rliicli Aclrniml Colomb 113s referred to. 
Look nt t h e  wnrs of Xapoleon. Tlic brilliant expedition to E g j p t  wns only possible 
on account of tlie conimand of tlic scas hnring bccn preriousl obtaincd by tho 
Bnttlc of tlic xilo. I need not dxc11 on tlie ~cninsulnr  \Tnr, wEicli vas rrndcrtc1 
possiblc by the absolute conimnnd of the ee3 hnritig been confirmed a t  TrafnlFar. 
Tl~csc nrc facts in  wliirli I think our friends of tlic Army must rccognirc thet  
tho$c brilliant ncliicrements which harc  distinpui3lictl their Serricc so grently for 
tho last 200 renrs hnre been possiblc b m u s e  xvc licld the  mmmond of the sea. 
[The discussion xts tbcn ndjourncd to 4th 3Iarch.l 
hlondny, J ln rch  4. 
ADJOURSED D~scuss~ox. 
GESERAL SIR FREDERICK STEPHEXSO$, G.C.U., in tho Chnir. 
Lieutenant-Ocneral6ir GEKALD GEAnAX, g-C., (t.C.l[.c)., K.C.B. : Sir Frcderiek 
Stcphcnson and gcntlcnicn, wlintcvcr mny bc tho mcrits of Admiral Colomb's in- 
temtingpapcros D sampleof sound rc-a.wning,thcrecaii be noquestionasto itsnbility, 
and ns to its haring p r o d  niost raluablc in eliciting cxpres~ions of opinion froni 
comprtent Oliicerj of both Services, tI10ug11 I think the public will naturally nttncli 
11iorc importance to  the opinion of n n a r d  Ofieer wliodiffers from Admiral Colomb, 
n3 nll haw nlore or less hitlirrto, tlinn to tlint of n niilitnq OUiccr like mjsclf. I 
think tiintnll r h o  wish well to  the dcfrnccs of tho country,nnd I i n c l u d c t l i e ~ l l u n t  
Admikd, nltliough nn ndrcrsary, ~ i a r o  rcnson to fcel grntcful to Lord Cnmarvon for 
tlic admirably clear statement ho niade nt this Institution nt the prerious niccting, 
nnd tlint wc may feel come confidence in tlic decision of a Commission of which ho 
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